Moscow: 2003 - 590 p.

The most established positions and conclusions of the world international political science are generalized and systematized; its basic concepts and the most famous theoretical directions are given; gives an idea of ​​the current state of this discipline in our country and abroad. Special attention is paid to the globalization of world development, changes in the nature of threats to international security, and the specifics of a new generation of conflicts. For students of higher educational institutions studying in the areas and specialties of International Relations, Regional Studies, Public Relations, Sociology, Political Science, as well as undergraduates, postgraduates and university professors.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword 9
Chapter 1. Object and subject of international political science 19
1. The concept and criteria of international relations 20.
2. World politics 27
3. The relationship between domestic and foreign policy 30
4. The subject of international political science 37
Literature 44
Chapter 2. The problem of method in the theory of international relations 46
1. Significance of the problem of method 46
2. Methods for analyzing the situation 50
Observation 51
Examining Documents 51
Comparison 52
3. Explicative methods 54
Content Analysis 54
Event-apalysis 54
Cognitive mapping 55
Experiment 57
4 Predictive methods 58
Delphic Method 59
Scripting 59
Systems approach. 60
5. Analysis of the decision-making process 70
Literature 75
Chapter 3. The problem of laws of international relations 77
1; On the nature of laws in the field of international relations 78
2. The content of the laws of international relations 82.
3. Universal laws of international relations 89
Literature 94
Chapter 4. Traditions, paradigms and disputes in TMO 95
1. Traditions: international relations in the history of socio-political thought 97
2. "Canonical" paradigms: main provisions 105
Liberal-idealist paradigm 106
Political Realism 109
Marxist-Leninist Paradigm 113
3. "Big debates": the place of political realism 117
Literature 122
Chapter 5. Modern schools and trends in the theory of international relations 125
1. The controversy between neorealism and neoliberalism 126
Neorealism 126
Neoliberalism 132
Key points of the neo-realism-neoliberalism debate 136
2. International Political Economy and Neo-Marxism 140
International Political Economy 140
Neo-Marxism 149
3. Sociology of international relations 155.
Literature 163
Chapter 6. International System 167
1. Basic concepts of systems theory 168
2. Features and main directions of the systematic approach in the analysis of international relations 173
3. Types and structures of international systems 178
4. Laws of functioning and transformation of international systems 184
Literature 192
Chapter 7. Environment of the system of international relations 193
1. Features of the environment of international relations 194
2. Social environment. Features of the modern stage of world civilization 196
3. Biosocial environment. The Role of Geopolitics in the Science of International Relations 201
4. Globalization of the international environment 212
The concept of globalization in comparison with other, similar concepts 214
The question of the historical uniqueness of globalization 217
The main ingredients of globalization 219
The controversy over the consequences of globalization 221
Literature 225
Chapter 8. Participants in International Relations 228
1. The essence and role of the state as a participant in international relations 231
2. Non-state participants in international relations 238
Main features and typology of IGOs ​​239
General characteristics and types of INGOs 242
3. The paradox of participation 248
Literature 252
Chapter 9. Goals, Means and Strategies of Participants in International Relations 254
1. On the content of the concepts of "ends" and "means" 254
2. Strategy as a unity of goals and means 267
Understanding Strategy 267
Great strategy .; 270
Crisis Management Strategies 271
Peace Strategies 272
Strategy and diplomacy 275
3. Force and violence as ends and means 277
Literature 286
Chapter 10. National interests: concept, structure, methodological and political role 288
1. Discussions about the legality of use and the content of the concept of "national interest" 288
2. Criteria and structure of national interest 298
On the unconscious element in the structure of national interest 304
3. Globalization and National Interest 307
Literature 317
Chapter 11. International Security 320
1. The content of the concept of "security" and the main theoretical approaches to its study 320
2. Changing security environment and new global threats 331
3. New security concepts 338
Cooperative Security Concept 339
Human Security Concept 343
Democratic Peace Theory 344
Literature 347
Chapter 12. The problem of legal regulation of international relations 349
1. Historical forms and features of the regulatory role of international law 350
2. Features of modern international law and its basic principles 353
Basic principles of international law 358
3. Human rights law and international humanitarian law 360
Human disposition right 360
International humanitarian law (IHL) 364
Humanitarian Intervention Concept 367
4. Interaction of law and morality in international relations 372
Literature 376
Chapter 13. The Ethical Dimension of International Relations 378
1. Morality and law in international relations: general and special 379
2. The variety of interpretations of international morality 382
Confessional and cultural performances 383
Conflict of theoretical schools 385
Holism, individualism, deontology 390
3. Basic imperatives of international morality in the light of globalization 395
The main requirements of international morality 395
Globalization and the New Normative 398
On the effectiveness of moral standards in international relations 401
Literature 404
Chapter 14. Conflicts in international relations 406
1. The concept of conflict .. Features of international conflicts in the era of the Cold War 407
Concept, types and functions of conflict 407
Conflicts and crises 410
Features and functions of conflict in a bipolar world 412
Conflict Resolution: Traditional Techniques
and institutional arrangements 413
2. The main directions in the study of international conflicts 417
Strategic Studies 417
Conflict Research 420
World exploration 423
3. Features of "new generation conflicts" 426
General context 426
Reasons, participants, content 428
Settlement Mechanisms 431
Literature 438
Chapter 15. International cooperation 440
1. The concept and types of international cooperation 440
2. Interstate cooperation from the standpoint of political realism 443
3. The theory of international regimes 447
4. Sociological approach to the analysis of international cooperation 450
5. Cooperation and integration processes 457
Literature 468
Chapter 16. Social Foundations of International Order 470
1. The concept of international order and its historical types 470
The concept of "international order" 470
Historical types of international order 475
Post-war international order 479
2. Political and sociological approaches to the problem of international order 484
3. Foreign and domestic scientists on the prospects of a new world order 492
Literature 504
Instead of a conclusion 507
Appendix 1. Some international principles, doctrines, theories. International organizations, treaties and agreements 510
Appendix 2. Resources on the Internet dedicated to research in the field of international relations (AB Tsruzhitt) | 538
Author Index 581
Index 587

International relations have long occupied an essential place in the life of any state, society and individual. The origin of nations, the formation of interstate borders, the formation and change of political regimes, the formation of various social institutions, the enrichment of cultures, the development of art, science, technological progress and an efficient economy are closely related to trade, financial, cultural and other exchanges, interstate alliances, diplomatic contacts and military conflicts - or, in other words, with international relations. Their importance is growing even more today, when all countries are woven into a dense, ramified network of diverse interactions that affect the volume and nature of production, the types of goods created and prices for them, consumption standards, values ​​and ideals of people.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the world socialist system, the entry into the international arena of the former Soviet republics as independent states, the search for new Russia its place in the world, the definition of its foreign policy priorities, the reformulation of national interests - all these and many other circumstances of international life have a direct impact on the everyday existence of people and the fate of Russians, on the present and future of our country, its immediate environment and, in a sense, on the fate of humanity as a whole. “In the light of what has been said, it becomes clear that today the objective need for a theoretical understanding of international relations, in the analysis of the changes taking place here and their consequences, and not least in the expansion and deepening of the relevant topics in the general humanitarian training of students, is sharply increasing.

Tsygankov P. Political Sociology of International Relations

Chapter I. Theoretical origins and conceptual foundations of the political sociology of international relations

The political sociology of international relations is an integral part of the science of international relations, which includes diplomatic history, international law, world economy, military strategy and many other disciplines. Of particular importance is the theory of international relations, which is understood as a set of multiple conceptual generalizations presented by polemicizing theoretical schools and constituting the subject field of a relatively autonomous discipline. This discipline, called in the West "International Relations", is being rethought in the light of the general sociological understanding of the world as a single society of the sphere of interaction between individuals and diverse social communities, operating in the context of the global changes observed today affecting the fate of mankind and the existing world order. In the above sense, the theory of international relations, as emphasized by S. Hoffmann, is both very old and very young. Already in ancient times, political philosophy and history raised questions about the causes of conflicts and wars, about the means and methods of achieving peace between peoples, about the rules of their interaction, etc., and therefore it is old. But at the same time, it is young, because it involves a systematic study of the observed phenomena, designed to identify the main determinants, explain behavior, reveal the typical, repeated in the interaction of international authors. This study refers mainly to the post-war period. Only after 1945 does the theory of international relations really begin to free itself from the "strangulation" of history and from the "oppression" of legal science. In fact, in the same period, the first attempts to "sociologize" it appeared, which subsequently (in the late 50s and early 60s) led to the formation (though continuing to this day) of the sociology of international relations as a relatively autonomous discipline.

Based on the foregoing, understanding the theoretical sources and conceptual foundations of the sociology of international relations involves turning to the views of the predecessors of modern international political science, considering the most influential theoretical schools and trends today, as well as analyzing the current state of the sociology of international relations.

1. International relations in the history of socio-political thought

One of the first written sources containing a deep analysis of the relationship between sovereign political units was written more than two thousand years ago by Thucydides (471-401 BC) "History of the Peloponnesian War in Eight Books." Many of the positions and conclusions of the ancient Greek historian have not lost their significance to this day, thereby confirming his words that the work he compiled is "not so much a subject of competition for temporary listeners as a property forever." Asked about the reasons for the long-term exhausting war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, the historian draws attention to the fact that these were the most powerful and prosperous nations, each of which dominated over its allies. "... From the time of the Median wars to the last, they did not cease to reconcile, then fight with each other, or with the falling away allies, and they improved in military affairs, became more sophisticated in the midst of dangers and became more skillful" (ibid., P. 18). Since both powerful states turned into a kind of empire, the strengthening of one of them seemed to doom them to continue this path, pushing them to the desire to subjugate all their surroundings in order to maintain their prestige and influence. In turn, the other "empire", as well as smaller city-states, experiencing growing fear and anxiety about such a strengthening, take measures to strengthen their defenses, thereby being drawn into a cycle of conflict, which ultimately inevitably turns into war. That is why Thucydides from the very beginning separates the causes of the Peloponnesian war from the various reasons for it: "The most real reason, although in words the most hidden, is, in my opinion, that the Athenians, by their strengthening, instilled fear in the Lacedaemonians and thus led them to war." (see note 2-volume 1, page 24).

Thucydides speaks not only of the domination of power in relations between sovereign political units. In his work, you can find a mention of the interests of the state, as well as the priority of these interests over the interests of an individual (see note 2, vol. 1, p. 91; vol. II, p. 60). Thus, in a sense, he became the ancestor of one of the most influential trends in later concepts and in modern science of international relations. In the future, this direction, which received the name classic or traditional, was represented in the views of N. Machiavelli (1469-1527), T. Hobbes (1588-1679), E. de Wattel (1714-1767) and other thinkers, acquiring the most complete form in the work of the German general K. von Clausewitz (1780 -1831).

So, T. Hobbes proceeds from the fact that man is by nature an egoistic being. It contains an enduring desire for power. Since people are not naturally equal in their abilities, their rivalry, mutual distrust, desire to possess material goods, prestige or fame lead to a constant "war of all against everyone and everyone against everyone", which is the natural state of human relationships. In order to avoid mutual extermination in this war, people come to the need to conclude a social contract, the result of which is the Leviathan state. This happens through a voluntary transfer by people to the state of their rights and freedoms in exchange for guarantees of public order, peace and security. However, if relations between individuals are thus introduced into the channel, albeit artificial and relative, but still a civil state, then relations between states continue to be in a natural state. Being independent, states are not bound by any restrictions. Each of them owns what it is able to capture ”and as long as it is able to hold the captured. Thus, the only "regulator" of interstate relations is force, and the participants in these relations themselves are in the position of gladiators, holding weapons at the ready and wary of watching each other's behavior.

A variation of this paradigm is the theory of political equilibrium, which was adhered to, for example, by the Dutch thinker B. Spinoza (1632-1677), the English philosopher D. Hume (1711-1776), as well as the above-mentioned Swiss lawyer E. de Wattel. Thus, de Vattel's view of the essence of interstate relations is not as gloomy as that of Hobbes. The world has changed, he believes, and at least “Europe is a political system, a whole in which everything is connected with the relations and different interests of the nations living in this part of the world. It is not, as it once was, a disorderly heap of separate particles, each of which considered itself little interested in the fate of others and rarely cared about what did not concern itself directly. " The constant attention of sovereigns to everything that happens in Europe, the constant presence of embassies, constant negotiations contribute to the formation of independent European states, along with national interests, of the interests of maintaining order and freedom in it. “It is this, de Vattel emphasizes, that gave rise to the famous idea of ​​political balance, the balance of power. This is understood as such an order of things in which no power is able to absolutely prevail over others and establish laws for them. "

At the same time, E. de Vattel, in full accordance with the classical tradition, believed that the interests of individuals are secondary in comparison with the interests of the nation (state). In turn, “if we are talking about saving the state, then you cannot be overly prudent” when there is reason to believe that the strengthening of a neighboring state threatens your security. “If it is so easy to believe in the threat of danger, then the neighbor is to blame, showing various signs of his ambitious intentions” (see note 4, p. 448). This means that a preemptive war against a dangerously eminent neighbor is legal and just. But what if the forces of this neighbor are far superior to those of other states? In this case, de Vattel replies, “it is easier, more convenient and more correct to resort to ... the formation of coalitions that could oppose the most powerful state and prevent it from dictating its will. This is what the sovereigns of Europe are doing now. They join the weaker of the two main powers, which are natural rivals, designed to restrain each other, as appendages to the less loaded scale in order to keep it in balance with the other cup "(see note 4, p. 451).

In parallel with the traditional, another direction is developing, the emergence of which in Europe is associated with the philosophy of the Stoics, the development of Christianity, the views of the Spanish theologian Dominican. F. Vittoria (1480-1546), the Dutch lawyer G. Grotius (1583-1645), the representative of the German classical philosophy I. Kant (1724-1804) and other thinkers. It is based on the idea of ​​the moral and political unity of the human race, as well as inalienable, natural human rights. In different eras, in the views of different thinkers, this idea took on different forms.

Thus, in the interpretation of F. Vittoria (see 2, p. 30), the priority in relations between a person and the state belongs to the person, while the state is nothing more than a simple necessity that facilitates the problem of human survival. On the other hand, the unity of the human race ultimately makes any division of it into separate states secondary and artificial. Therefore, a normal, natural human right is his right to free movement. In other words, Vittoria places natural human rights above the prerogatives of the state, anticipating and even ahead of the modern liberal-democratic interpretation of this issue.

The considered direction has always been accompanied by the conviction that it is possible to achieve eternal peace between people either through legal and moral regulation of international relations, or in other ways associated with the self-realization of historical necessity. According to Kant, for example, just as relations between individuals based on contradictions and self-interest will ultimately inevitably lead to the establishment of a legal society, relations between states should end in the future with a state of eternal, harmoniously regulated peace (see note 5, Ch. VII). Since the representatives of this trend appeal not so much to the real as to the ought, and, in addition, rely on the corresponding philosophical ideas, insofar as the name of the idealistic one has been assigned to it.

The emergence of Marxism in the middle of the 19th century heralded the emergence of another paradigm in the views of international relations, which cannot be reduced to either the traditional or the idealistic direction. According to Karl Marx, world history begins with capitalism, for the basis of the capitalist mode of production is large-scale industry, which creates a single world market, the development of communications and transport. The bourgeoisie, by exploiting the world market, transforms the production and consumption of all countries into a cosmopolitan one and becomes the ruling class not only in individual capitalist states, but also on a global scale. In turn, "to the same extent that the bourgeoisie, that is, capital, develops, so does the proletariat." Thus, international relations in economic terms become relations of exploitation. On the political plane, they are relations of domination and subordination and, as a consequence, relations of class struggle and revolutions. Thus, national sovereignty and state interests are secondary, for objective laws contribute to the formation of a world society in which the capitalist economy dominates and the class struggle and the world-historical mission of the proletariat are the driving force. "National isolation and the opposition of peoples, wrote K. Marx and F. Engels, are disappearing more and more with the development of the bourgeoisie, with free trade, the world market, with the uniformity of industrial production and the corresponding living conditions" (see note 6, p. 444).

In turn, V.I. Lenin emphasized that capitalism, having entered the state-monopoly stage of development, was transformed into imperialism. In his work "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism" 7 he writes that with the end of the era of the political division of the world between imperialist states, the problem of its economic division between the monopolies comes to the fore. Monopolies face an ever-worsening market problem and the need to export capital to less developed countries with higher profit margins. Inasmuch as they collide with each other in fierce competition, this necessity becomes the source of world political crises, wars and revolutions.

The considered basic theoretical paradigms in the science of international relations, classical, idealistic and Marxist in general, remain relevant today. At the same time, it should be noted that the constitution of this science into a relatively independent field of knowledge entailed a significant increase in the variety of theoretical approaches and methods of study, research schools and conceptual directions. Let's consider them in more detail.

2. Modern theories of international relations

The above diversity has greatly complicated and the problem of classification of modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by certain authors.

So, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, highlighting the Anglo-Saxon concepts, the Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the "third world" 8.

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (to which the behavioral school is attributed) 9. Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author G. Briar refers to the general theories of political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations. As for private theories, the environment of them is called the theory of international authors (B. Korani); theory of interactions within international systems (O. R. Young; S. Amin; K. Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace studies (A. Beaufre, D. Singer, I. Galtung); integration theory (A. Etzioni; K. Deutsch); theories of international organization (J. Siotis; D. Holly) 10.

Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers and, from this point of view, focus on polemics between representatives of the traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations 11,12.

The fourth point out the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, emphasizing the main and turning points in the development of science 13.

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist B. Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations based on the methods they use ("classical" and "modernist") and the conceptual vision of the world ("liberal-pluralistic" and "materialist-structuralist"). As a result, he singles out such directions as political realism (G. Morgenthau, R. Aron, H. Bul), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin) and neo-Marxism (or the school of "dependence": I. Wollerstein, S. Amin, A. Frank, F. Cardoso) 14. Likewise, D. Coliard drew attention to the classical theory of the "state of nature" and its modern version (that is, political realism); the theory of the "international community" (or political idealism); the Marxist ideological trend and its many interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French school of international relations 15. M. Merle believes that the main trends in modern science of international relations are represented by traditionalists by the heirs of the classical school (G. Morgenthau, S. Hoffmann, G. Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (R. Cox, D. Singer, M. Kaplan; D. Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin) currents 16.

Examples of different classifications of modern theory of international relations could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant points. Firstly, any of these classifications is conditional and is not able to exhaust the variety of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their "blood relationship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, the question of the still encountered and today the opposite opinion, there is every reason to talk about the outlined synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual "compromise" between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we restrict ourselves to a brief consideration of such directions (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-marxism.

The legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Wattel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vittoria, Grotius, Kant on the other, was directly reflected in a major scientific discussion that arose in the United States between the two world wars, a discussion between idealists and realists.

Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical origins, which are utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the conviction of the necessity and possibility of putting an end to world wars and armed conflicts between states by legal regulation and democratization of international relations, spreading the norms of morality and justice to them. According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of settling conflicts between its members peacefully, using the methods of legal regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that contribute to the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange. One of its priority themes is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism was embodied in the program for the creation of the League of Nations 17 developed after the First World War by the American President W. .), according to which the United States waives diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found some embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State J.F. Dulles and Secretary of State Z. Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), Presidents D. Carter (1976-1980) and G. Bush (1988-1992). In the scientific literature, it was presented, in particular, by the book by the American authors R. Clarke and L.B. Sona "Achievement of Peace through World Law". The book proposes a project of phased disarmament and the creation of a collective security system for the whole world for the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between peoples should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution. Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors 19. The idea of ​​a world government was also expressed in the papal encyclicals: John XXIII "Pacem in terris" from 04.16.63, Paul VI "Populorum progressio" from 03.26.67, as well as John-Paul II from 2. 12.80, which even today advocates the creation of "political power endowed with universal competence."

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds today. Moreover, we can say that in recent years its influence on some aspects theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, hopelessly lagging behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it was deeply undermined by the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was the revival on American soil of the European classical tradition with its inherent advancement in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as "strength" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict".

Political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing, in particular, to the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time contributed greatly to the outbreak of World War II, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives R. Niebuhr, F. Schumann, J. Kennan, J. Schwarzenberger, K. Thompson, G. Kissinger, E. Carr, A. Wolfers and others have long defined the ways of the science of international relations. G. Morgenthau and R. Aron became the undisputed leaders of this trend.

The work of G. Morgenthau “Politics among the nation. Struggle for influence and peace ”, the first edition of which was published in 1948, has become a kind of“ bible ”for many generations of political science students in the United States and other Western countries. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau "international relations are an arena of acute confrontation between states. At the heart of all the international activities of the latter is the desire to increase their power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. At the same time, the term "power" is understood in the broadest sense: as the military and economic power of the state, a guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, the possibility of spreading its ideological attitudes and spiritual values. The two main ways in which the state secures power for itself, and at the same time, two complementary aspects of its foreign policy are military strategy and diplomacy. The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is a peaceful struggle for power. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest." The result of the desire of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests is the establishment in the world arena of a certain equilibrium (balance) of power (force), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of the world is the state of the balance of power between states.

According to Mergentau, there are two factors that are capable of keeping states' aspirations for power within a certain framework: international law and morality. However, to trust them too much in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealistic school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being resolved through collective security mechanisms or through the UN. Projects for the harmonization of national interests by creating a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hopefully avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from the six principles of political realism, which he substantiates already at the very beginning of his book 20. In short, they look like this.

1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, there is the possibility of creating a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws, although only relatively and partially. This theory allows you to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It provides a link between reason seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be learned. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Thus, this notion avoids two mistakes. First, judgments about a politician's interest based on motives, not on the basis of his behavior, and, secondly, deriving the politician's interest from his ideological or moral preferences, and not "official duties."

Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. A sound policy is the right policy because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept "interest expressed in terms of power" is not unchanged. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the international policy of the state is being formed. This also applies to the concepts of "power" and "political equilibrium", as well as to such an initial concept designating the main actor in international politics as "state-nation".

Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change the modern world. He is convinced that such a change can be carried out only through the skillful use of objective laws that operated in the past and will operate in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time he is aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. Oki must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!" It cannot afford to commit suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. Political realism refuses to equate the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral norms. It is one thing to know that nations obey the moral law in their policies, and quite another to claim knowledge of what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. The theory of political realism is based on a pluralistic concept of human nature. A real person is both an "economic person" and a "moral person" and a "religious person" and so on. Only a political person ”is like an animal, because he has no“ moral brakes ”. Only a "moral person" is a fool, since he is devoid of caution. Only a "religious person" can only be a saint, since he has no earthly desires.

Recognizing this, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from the others and occurs in its own terms.

As we will see from what follows, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents and, moreover, opponents of this trend. At the same time, his conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, an impartial and rigorous analysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them, all this contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism in the academic environment. and in the circles of statesmen of various countries.

However, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. From the very beginning, its serious shortcomings prevented its transformation into the central link, cementing the beginning of a unified theory.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a "natural state" of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism essentially reduces these relations to interstate relations, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state, as interpreted by political realists, look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves look like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies with an identical response to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong and others are weak. No wonder one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table. Absolutizing the role of power and underestimating the importance of other factors, for example, such as spiritual values, sociocultural realities, etc. significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations, reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true since the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its striving to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has essentially become a hostage of its own approach. He lost sight of the very important trends and changes that have already taken place, which increasingly distinguish the nature of modern international relations from those that prevailed in the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, one more circumstance was overlooked: these changes require the use, along with traditional, and new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All this caused criticism of political realism from adherents of other approaches, and, above all, from representatives of the so-called modernist direction and various theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to the growing awareness of the need to complement the political analysis of international realities with a sociological one.

Representatives of modernism ", or " scientific " trends in the analysis of international relations, most often without touching upon the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The controversy between "modernists" and "traditionalists" reaches a particular intensity since the 1960s, having received the name "new big dispute" in scientific literature (see, for example, notes 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (K. Wright, M. Kaplan, K. Deutsch, D. Singer, K. Holsty, E. Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. ... Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the intuition of the researcher, judgments by analogy, etc. This approach, which emerged in the United States, touched upon the study of not only international relations, but also other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil back in the 19th century.

Indeed, even Saint-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods already tested in disciplines such as sociology or psychology, an appropriate technical base that gives researchers new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by the rejection of a priori judgments about the influence of certain factors on the nature of international relations, the denial of both any "metaphysical prejudices" and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as M. Merl emphasizes (see note 16, pp. 91-92), such an approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposing models, between which social scientists also hesitate. On the one hand, this is Charles Darwin's doctrine of the merciless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation, on the other, the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the United States followed the second path of assimilating society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, then proceed to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to the problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to its environment. In the legacy of organicism, M. Merle believes, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on the study of the behavior of the characters, the other articulates the various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and the systems approach in the science of international relations (see note 16, p. 93).

Being a reaction to the shortcomings of the traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become any homogeneous trend, either theoretically or methodologically. What he has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and an increase in the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which leads to the actual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivity. Nevertheless, many studies of the adherents of the modernist direction turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also with very significant conclusions drawn on their basis. It is also important to note the fact that they opened up the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then the representatives transnationalism(R.O. Keohan, J. Nye), integration theories(D. Mitrani) and interdependence(E. Haas, D. Moores) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. The role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and power for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage, turned out to be at the center of the new "big dispute" that erupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward the general idea that political realism and its inherent statist paradigm do not correspond to the nature and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and military confrontation. The state as an international author is deprived of its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The variety of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and "channels" (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) interactions between them push the state out of the center of international communication, contribute to the transformation of such communication from "international" (that is, interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) into "transnational" (that is, spruce carried out "in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond the framework of interstate interaction led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scholars J. Nye and R.O. Keohan (cited in: 3, p. 91-92).

This approach was significantly influenced by the ideas put forward in 1969 by J. Rosenau about the relationship between the internal life of society and international relations, about the role of social, economic and cultural factors in explaining the international behavior of governments, about “external” sources that may have purely “ internal ”, at first glance, events, etc. 23.

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, the transformation of the situation on world markets, the growth of the number and importance of transnational corporations have stimulated the emergence of new trends in the world arena. The predominant among them are: the outstripping growth of world trade in comparison with world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes is the growing interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations. Supporters of transnationalism are often inclined to view the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, to the analysis of which the same methods are applicable that make it possible to understand and explain the processes taking place in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, therefore, many of the provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (see, for example: 25). At the same time, he was imprinted by an undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism with its inherent tendencies to overestimate the real significance of the observed trends in changing the nature of international relations.

Some similarity of the provisions put forward by transnationalism with a number of provisions defended by the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations is noticeable.

Representatives neo-Marxism(P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin, A. Immanuel, I. Wollerstein and others), a trend that is as heterogeneous as transnationalism is also united by the idea of ​​the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in the assessment of its future. At the same time, the starting point and the basis of their conceptual construction is the idea of ​​the asymmetry of the interdependence of the modern world and, moreover, of the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, of the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the colonial countries had previously gained their political independence. This manifests itself in unequal economic exchanges and uneven development 26.

For example, the "center", within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends for its development on the raw materials and resources of the "periphery". In turn, the periphery countries are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. Thus, they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the end, “economic growth based on integration into the world market is the development of underdevelopment” 27.

In the 70s, such an approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the third world countries of the idea of ​​the need to establish a new world economic order. Under pressure from these countries, which constitute the majority of the member states of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year a Charter on the economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has its own strengths and weaknesses, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, the enrichment of the science of international relations in general. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of one of the trends over the rest, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (R.O. Keohan, K. Holsty, K. Waltz, R. Gilpin, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time to enrich it, taking into account new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical trends ... It is significant that one of the longest-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohein, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism "strength", "national interest", rational behavior, etc., remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations 28. On the other hand, K. Waltz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach at the expense of the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of conclusions, the need for which the supporters of the traditional view, as a rule, rejected. Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, to make the existence of the global system, and not the states that are its elements, his starting point, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.

And yet, as B. Korani emphasizes, this revival of realism is much less explained by its own advantages than by the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to preserve the maximum continuity with the classical school means that the lot of neorealism remains the majority of its inherent shortcomings (see note 14, pp. 300-302). An even harsher sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smutz and B Badi, in whose opinion the theories of international relations, remaining in the foam of the West-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War, nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to a sinful social reality ”30.

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main incentives for the creation and improvement of the relatively autonomous discipline of the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scholars.

3. French sociological school

Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions. At the same time, since the beginning of the 1980s, the influence of European theoretical thought and, in particular, the French school has become more and more tangible in this area. One of the famous scientists, professor at the Sorbonne M. Merle in 1983 noted that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline studying international relations, three major directions have formed. One of them is guided by the "empirical-descriptive approach" and is presented by the works of such authors as K.A. Colliar, S. Zorgbib, S. Dreyfus, F. Moro-Defargue and others. The second is inspired by the Marxist theses on which P.F. Gonidek, C. Chaumont and their followers at the School of Nancy and Reims. A distinctive feature of the third direction is the sociological approach, which was most vividly embodied in the works of R. Aron31.

In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of the modern French school in the study of international relations seems to be especially interesting. The fact is that each of the theoretical trends discussed above, idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism, exist in France as well. At the same time, they are refracted in the works of the historical and sociological direction that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left an imprint on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with problems of international relations. As Russian experts note, the formation of the basic methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of the philosophical, sociological and historical thought of France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and above all Comte's positivism. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative-historical method and skepticism about mathematical methods of research 32.

At the same time, in the works of specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main currents of sociological thought that emerged already in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical legacy of E. Durkheim, the second is based on the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with the utmost clarity by such major representatives of the two lines in French sociology of international relations as, for example, R. Aron and G. Butoul.

"The sociology of Durkheim, writes R. Aron in his memoirs, did not touch in me either the metaphysics that I was striving to become, or the reader of Proust, who wants to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society." "Neo-Durkheimism", he argued, is something like Marxism, on the contrary: if the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and belittles the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, denying the presence of a dominant ideology in society is the same utopia as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot share the same values, just as totalitarian and liberal societies cannot have the same theory (see note ЗЗ, pp. 69-70). Weber, on the other hand, attracted Aaron by the fact that, by objectifying social reality, he did not "materialize" it, did not ignore the rationality that people give to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: M. Weber's assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics and concern for epistemology, characteristic of social sciences (see note. ЗЗ, p. 71). The oscillation, central to Weber's thought, between a multitude of plausible interpretations and the only correct explanation of a particular social phenomenon became the basis for the Aronian view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativeism in understanding social, including international relations.

It is therefore quite logical that R. Aron considers international relations in the spirit of political realism as a natural or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a radical change in the main feature of international relations, which consists in the legality and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron stresses, peace is impossible, but war is also incredible. Hence, the specificity of the sociology of international relations follows: its main problems are determined not by the minimum of social consensus, which is characteristic of intrasocial relations, but by the fact that they "unfold in the shadow of war", because it is the conflict, not the absence, that is normal for international relations. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not the state of the world, but the state of war.

R. Aron names four groups of basic problems of the sociology of international relations, applicable to the conditions of traditional (pre-industrial) civilization. First, it is "clarifying the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society." Second, "the study of which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Third, the study "in each era, in each specific diplomatic system, that set of unwritten rules, more or less observed values ​​that characterize wars and the behavior of the communities themselves in relation to each other." Finally, fourthly, an analysis of the “unconscious functions that armed conflicts have performed in history” 34.

Of course, most of the current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of flawless sociological research in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, insofar as the above problems retain their significance today. To them can be added new ones arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the XX century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations remains the same, as long as it is determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the central problem will remain the study of the decision-making process. Hence, Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who govern states from "rulers" "who can only be advised and hoped that they will not be crazy." This means that "sociology, applied to international relations, reveals, so to speak, its boundaries" (see note 34, p. 158).

At the same time, Aron does not abandon the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his fundamental work "Peace and War among Nations", he identifies four aspects of such a study, which he describes in the relevant sections of this book: "Theory", "Sociology", "History" and "Praxeologia" 35 "

The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Resorting to his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels theory... The first is designed to answer the questions about “what techniques players have the right to use and what not; how they are distributed on the different lines of the playing court; what they are doing to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the enemy's efforts. "

Within the framework of the rules that answer such questions, numerous situations can arise: both random and pre-planned. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations that may develop on the court. At this second level of theory, it defines recommendations that describe the rules for the effective behavior of various participants (for example, goalkeeper, defender, etc.) in certain circumstances of the game. Strategy and diplomacy are singled out and analyzed as typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, a set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations, are considered.

On this basis is built sociology international relations, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international authors. Sociology is designed to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this way, and not otherwise. Her the main task the study determinant and patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables determining the policy of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes such issues as the nature of the influence of the political regime and / or ideology on international relations. Finding them out allows a sociologist to derive not only certain rules of behavior for international authors, but also to identify social types of international conflicts, as well as to formulate the laws of development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, we can say that at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or coach. Now he is solving questions of a different kind. How do the matches unfold not on the chalkboard, but on the playground? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? What is the share of technical virtuosity in the success of the team, and what is the moral qualities of the team?

It is impossible to answer these questions, Aron continues, without addressing historical research: it is necessary to monitor the progress of specific matches, changes in their "pattern", a variety of techniques and temperaments. The sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then it will be in vain to follow the actions of the players, because he will not be able to understand its tactical meaning. In the section devoted to history, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of intimidation strategy in the nuclear age, traces the evolution of diplomacy between the two poles of the bipolar world and within each of them.

Finally, in the fourth part, devoted to praxeology, another symbolic character, the arbiter, appears. How should the provisions written in the rules of the game be interpreted? Was there a violation of the rules in certain conditions? Moreover, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of one team “judge” both their partners and rivals, and so on. All of these judgments fluctuate between an assessment of efficiency (he played well), an assessment of punishment (he acted according to the rules) and an assessment of sports morale (this team behaved in accordance with the spirit of the game). Even in sports, not everything that is not prohibited is morally justified. Moreover, this applies to international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited only to observation and description; it requires judgment and evaluations. Which strategy can be considered moral and which is reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of seeking peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?

As already noted, Aron's book "Peace and War between Nations" has played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school and, in particular, the sociology of international relations. Of course, the followers of his views (J.-P. Derrienik, R. Bosc, J. Unziger and others) take into account that many of the positions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that “he did not half achieve his goal”, and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns precisely the sociological section and, in particular, the concrete application of laws and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see note 34, p. .457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and the main justification for the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.

Explaining his position, J.-P. Derrienik 36 emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology: deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and the sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is rather arbitrary, for actionism does not deny causality, and determinism is also "subjective", for it is a formulation of the researcher's intention. Its justification lies in the researcher's necessary distrust of the judgments of the people he is studying. Specifically, this difference lies in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of reasons of a special kind that must be taken into account. These reasons for the decision, that is, the choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is the sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (which is associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with evaluation criteria). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problematics of sociology of international relations is the concept of "decision". At the same time, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue, in the opinion of the sociologist (that is, from interests).

As for the second trend in French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid down by G. Butoul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as J.-L. Annequin, R. Carrer, J. Freund, L. Poirier and others. Polemology is based on a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of "collective aggressiveness" with the use of methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences. The basis of polemology, writes G. Butul, is dynamic sociology. The latter is "a part of the science that studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors that condition them or correspond to them, as well as the ways of their reproduction" 37. Proceeding from E. Durkheim's position on sociology as "a history comprehended in a certain way," polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave rise to history, since the latter began exclusively as a history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be a "history of wars." Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and borrowing of cultures, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, "violent imitation": war does not allow states and peoples to lock themselves in autarchy, self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact between civilizations. But, in addition, this is a "voluntary imitation" associated with the fact that peoples borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging wars, etc. down to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technological progress: for example, the desire to destroy Carthage became an incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding. And today all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most visible of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.

Polemology must avoid a political and legal approach, bearing in mind that "politics is the enemy of sociology", which it constantly tries to subjugate, to make its servant, just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology actually cannot study current conflicts, and, therefore, the main thing for it is the historical approach.

The main task of polemology is the objective scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that is observable just like any other social phenomenon and which at the same time is able to explain the reasons for global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles associated with the pseudo-evidence of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should talk about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with legal illusion, explaining the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (assimilation of wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of the sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the joining of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.

What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “ new chapter in sociology ”, as G. Butul calls the polemological direction in his book (see note 37, p.8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has a truly huge source study base for its purposes, which is rarely at the disposal of other branches of sociological science. That's why main question is in what directions to carry out the classification of the countless facts of this huge array of documentation. Butul names eight such directions: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their decreasing objectivity; 2) a description of the types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of the participants in the wars about their goals; 3) the first stage of the explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts; 4) the second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical views and doctrines; 5) selection and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the frequency of wars; 8) the social typology of wars, that is, the dependence of the main characteristics of a war on the typical features of a particular society (see note | .37, pp. 18-25).

Based on this methodology, G. Butul puts forward and, using the methods of mathematics, biology, psychology and other sciences (including ethnomology), seeks to substantiate the classification of the causes of military conflicts proposed by him. As such, in his opinion, the following factors (according to the degree of diminishing community) act: 1) violation of the mutual equilibrium between social structures (for example, between the economy and demography); 2) the political conjuncture created as a result of such a violation (in full accordance with Durkheim's approach, they should be considered “as things”); 3) random reasons and motives; 4) aggressiveness and militant impulses as a psychological projection of psychosomatic states of social groups; 5) hostility and militant complexes ("Abraham's Complex"; "Damocles Complex"; "Goat Sensation Complex").

In the studies of polemologists, one can feel the obvious influence of American modernism and, in particular, the factorial approach to the analysis of international relations. This means that these scientists are also characterized by many disadvantages of this method, the main one of which is the absolutization of the role of "scientific methods" in the cognition of such a complex social phenomenon as war is justly considered to be. Such reductionism is inevitably associated with the fragmentation of the object under study, which contradicts the declared commitment to polemology of the macrosociological paradigm. The rigid determinism underlying polemology, the desire to banish accidents from among the causes of armed conflicts (see, for example, note 37) entail devastating consequences in terms of the research goals and objectives it proclaims. First, it creates distrust in its ability to develop a long-term forecast regarding the possibility of wars and their nature. And, secondly, it leads to the actual opposition of war as a dynamic state of society to the world as a "state of order and peace" 38. Accordingly, polemology is opposed to irenology (sociology of the world). However, in fact, the latter is completely deprived of its subject, since “the world can only be studied by studying war” (see note 37, p. 535).

At the same time, one should not lose sight of the theoretical merits of polemology, its contribution to the development of problems of armed conflicts, the study of their causes and nature. The main thing for us in this case is that the emergence of polemology played a significant role in the formation, legitimization and further development of the sociology of international relations, which found its direct or indirect reflection in the works of authors such as J. B. Durosel and R. Bosk, P. Assner and P.-M. Gallois, C. Zorgbib and F. Moreau-Defargue, J. Unzinger and M. Merle, A. Samuel, B. Badi and M.-C. Smutz and others, which we will refer to in subsequent chapters.

4. Domestic studies of international relations

Until recently, these studies were painted in the same color in Western literature. Essentially, a substitution took place: if, for example, conclusions about the state of research of international relations in American or French science were made on the basis of an analysis of the dominant theoretical schools and the views of individual scientists, then the state of Soviet science was highlighted through a description of the official foreign policy doctrine of the USSR, interpretations of the corresponding Marxist attitudes that were successively replacing each other by the Soviet regimes (the regime of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, etc.) (see, for example: note 8, p. 21-23; note 15, p. 30-31). Of course, there were reasons for this: under the conditions of total pressure from the official version of Marxism-Leninism and the subordination of social disciplines to the needs of "theoretical substantiation of party policy", scientific and publicistic literature on international relations could not but have a clearly expressed ideological orientation. Moreover, research in this area was in the zone of the closest attention of the all-powerful party authorities and state bodies. Therefore, for any research team that did not fall into the appropriate nomenclature, and even more so for a private person, professional theoretical work in this area was fraught with additional difficulties (due to the "closeness" of the necessary information) and risks (the cost of "error" could be too high). And the nomenklatura science of international relations itself had, as it were, three main levels. One of them was intended to serve the needs of the foreign policy practice of the regime (analytical notes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee of the CPSU and other "governing bodies") and was entrusted to only a limited number of organizations and individuals. Another was addressed to the scientific community (albeit often classified as "DSP"). And, finally, the third was called upon to solve propaganda tasks among the broad masses of "the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the field of foreign policy."

And yet, as can be judged on the basis of theoretical literature, the picture was not so monotonous then. Moreover, the Soviet science of international relations had both its own achievements and theoretical trends leading to polemics with each other. This will exchange, first of all, the fact that the Soviet science of international relations could not develop in absolute isolation from world thought. Moreover, some of its directions received a powerful inoculation from Western schools, in particular, American modernism 39. Others, proceeding from the paradigm of political realism, comprehend its conclusions taking into account domestic historical and political realities 40. Third, one can find an ideological relationship with transnationalism and attempts to use its methodology to enrich the traditional Marxist approach to the analysis of international relations 41. As a result of the analysis by specialists of Western theories of international relations, a wider circle of readers also got an idea about them 42.

Nevertheless, the dominant approach was, of course, orthodox Marxism-Leninism, so elements of any other ("bourgeois") paradigm had to be either integrated into it, or, when this failed, carefully "packed" into Marxist terminology, or, finally, submitted in the form of "criticism of bourgeois ideology." This also applied to works specially devoted to the sociology of international relations.

F.M. Burlatsky, A.A. Galkin and D.V. Ermolenko. Burlatsky and Galkin consider the sociology of international relations as an integral part of political science. Noting that the traditional disciplines and methods of studying international relations have proved to be insufficient and that this sphere of public life, more than any other, needs an integrated approach, they believe that it is best suited to this task. system analysis... In their opinion, it is the main feature of the sociological approach, which makes it possible to consider international relations in general theoretical terms 45. The system of international relations is understood by them as a grouping of states based on the criteria of a social class, socio-economic, military-political, socio-cultural and regional order. The main one is the social-class criterion. Therefore, the main subsystems of the system of international relations are represented by capitalist, socialist and developing states. Among other types of subsystems (for example, military-political or economic), there are both homogeneous (for example, the EEC or ATS) and heterogeneous (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement) subsystems (see note 45, pp. 265-273). The next level of the system is represented by its elements, in the role of which are foreign policy (or international) situations "the intersection of foreign policy interactions determined by time and substantive parameters" (see note 45, p. 273).

In addition to the above, the sociology of international relations, from the point of view of F.M. Burlatsky, is called upon to deal with such problems as: war and peace; international conflicts; optimization of international solutions; integration and internationalization processes; development of international communication; the relationship between domestic and foreign policy of the state; relations between socialist states 46.

V.D. Ermolenko, in his understanding of the discipline under consideration, also proceeded from the macrosociological paradigm, which, however, he interpreted more broadly: “both as a set of generalizations, and as a complex of concepts and methods” 47. In his opinion, the sociology of international relations is a sociological theory of the middle level, within the framework of which its own special conceptual apparatus, as well as a number of private methods are being created that allow for empirical and analytical research in the field of functioning, statics and dynamics of foreign policy situations, international events, factors, phenomena, etc. (see note 47, page 10). Accordingly, he singled out the following among the main problems that the sociology of international relations should deal with:

general analysis of the nature of international relations, their basic laws, main trends, the relationship and role of objective and subjective factors, economic, scientific, technical, political, cultural and ideological aspects in international relations, etc. special studies of the central categories of international relations (war and peace, non-political concept, foreign policy program, strategy and tactics, main directions and principles of foreign policy, foreign policy tasks, etc.);

a special study of categories indicating the position of a state in the international arena, its class nature, state interests, strength, potential, moral and ideological state of the population, ties and degree of unity with other states, etc.

special studies of the categories and problems associated with the practical implementation of foreign policy actions: foreign policy situation; foreign policy actions; foreign policy decisions and the mechanism of their preparation and adoption; foreign policy information and methods of its generalization, systematization and use; extra-political contradictions and conflicts and ways to resolve them; international agreements and agreements, etc. study of trends in the development of international relations and internal political events and the development of probabilistic pictures for the future (forecasting) (see note 47, p11-12). The described approach laid the conceptual basis for the study of specific problems of international relations using specially developed analytical methods that take into account the achievements of American modernism.

And yet it must be admitted that the development of the domestic science of international relations, squeezed into the narrow framework of the official ideology, experienced significant difficulties. A certain liberation from this framework was seen in the doctrine of "new political thinking" proclaimed in the mid-1980s by the creators of "perestroika". That is why, for some truth, a very short time, it was paid tribute even by those researchers who previously held views that were very far from its content 49 and who subsequently subjected it to sharp criticism 50.

The starting point of the "new political thinking" was the awareness of a fundamentally new political situation in the history of mankind in the context of those global challenges that it faced by the end of the second millennium. "The basic, initial principle of the new political thinking is simple, wrote M. Gorbachev, a nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological, or any goals" 51. The danger of a nuclear war and other global problems that threaten the very existence of civilization require a planetary, universal understanding. An important role in this is played by the understanding of the fact that the modern world is an indivisible whole, although there are different types of socio-political systems in it 52.

The statement of the integrity and interdependence of the world has led to the rejection of the assessment of the role of violence as the "midwife of history" and the conclusion that the desire to achieve a particular state of its own security should mean security for all. A new understanding of the relationship between power and security has also emerged. Security began to be interpreted in such a way that it can no longer be ensured by military means, but should be achieved only on the path of political settlement of existing problems and those arising in the course of the development of interstate relations. Genuine security can be guaranteed by an increasingly lower level of strategic balance, from which nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must be excluded. International security can only be universal, equal for all, the security of one of the parties increases or decreases to the same extent as the security of the other. Therefore, peace can be preserved only by creating a system of joint security. This requires a new approach to relations between different types of socio-political systems and states, highlighting not what separates them, but what they are interested in in common. Therefore, the balance of power must give way to a balance of interests. "Life itself, its dialectics, the global problems and dangers facing humanity require a transition from confrontation to cooperation between peoples and states, regardless of their social system."

The question of the relationship between class and universal human interests and values ​​was raised in a new way: it was declared the priority of the latter over the former and, accordingly, the need to de-ideologize international political, economic relations, cultural exchange, etc. Moreover, in the era of interdependence and universal values, it is not what separates them, but what unites them that comes to the fore in the interaction of states in the international arena, therefore, simple norms of morality and universal morality should be put in the basis of international relations, and these relations have been rebuilt based on the principles of democratization, humanization, a new, more just world order leading to a safe, nuclear-free world (see note 51, p. 143).

Thus, the concept of “new political thinking was a significant step towards overcoming the confrontational view of the world based on the principles of opposition and struggle between two socio-political systems, the world-historical mission of socialism, etc. At the same time, this concept had a dual, contradictory character. On the one hand, she tried to put together such incompatible things as an idealistic, normative approach to the analysis of international relations with the preservation of socialist, ultimately, class ideals 54.

On the other hand, "new political thinking" opposes "balance of power" and "balance of interests" to each other. In fact, as the history of international relations and their current state shows, the realization of national interests is the goal by which states are guided in their interactions in the world arena, while force is one of the main means on the way to achieving this goal. Both the "European Concert of Nations" in the 19th century and the "Gulf War" at the end of the 20th century indicate that the "balance of interests" largely depends on the "balance of power."

All these contradictions and compromises of the concept under consideration were revealed pretty soon, and accordingly, the short-term enthusiasm for it on the part of science passed, which, however, in the new political conditions ceased to be subject to ideological pressure, and, accordingly, needed official approval from the authorities. New opportunities have appeared for a developed sociology of international relations.

Notes (edit)

1. Hoffmann S. Theorie et relations intemationales. In: Revue francaise de Science politique. 1961 Vol. XI.p.26-27.
2. Thucydides. A History of the Penelope War in Eight Books. Translated from Greek by F.G. Mishchenko with his preface, notes and index. T.I M., 1987, p. 22.
3. Huntzinger J. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Paris, 1987, p. 22.
4. Emer be Wattel. The law of peoples or principles of natural law applied to the behavior and affairs of nations and sovereigns. M., 1960, p. 451.
5. Kant's philosophy and modernity. M., 1974, ch. Vii.
6. Marx K., Engels F. Communist Manifesto. K. Marx and F. Engels. Compositions. Ed. 2nd. T.4. M., 1955, p. 430.
7. Lenin V.I. Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Full collection op. Vol.27.
8. Martin P.-M. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Toulouse. 1982.
9. Bosc R. Sociologie de la paix. Par "s. 1965.
10. Braillard G. Theories des relations internationales. Paris, 1977.
11. Bull H. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. Xviii
12. Kuplan \ 1. A new Great Debate: Traditionalisme versus Science in International Relations. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. Xviii
13. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Critical analysis. M., 1976.
14. Korani B. et coll. Analyze des relations intemationales. Approches, concepts et donnees. Montreale, 1987.
15. Colard D. Les relations intemationales. Paris, New York, Barselone, Milan, Mexico, Sao Paulo. 1987.
16. Merle M. Sociologie des relations mternationales. Paris. 1974. 17 International relations as an object of study. M., 1993, ch. 1.
17. Clare C. and Sohn L.B. World Pease tround World Law. Cambridge, Massachussets. 1960.
18. Gerard F. L, Unite federale du monde. Paris. 1971. Periller L. Demain, le gouvernement mondial? Paris, 1974; Le Mondialisme. Paris. 1977.
19. Morgenthau H.J. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, 1955, p. 4-12.
20. Wolfers A. Discord and Colloboration. Essays on international Politics. Baltimore, 1962.
21. W ll H. The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. Xviii.
22. Rasenau J. Lincade Politics: Essay on the Convergence of National and International System. New York. 1969.
23. Nye J.S. (Jr.). Interdependence and changing international politics // World Economy and International Relations. 1989. No. 12.
24. Laard E. International Society. London, 1990.
25. Amin S. Le Developpement inedal Paris. 1973. Emmanuel A. L "echange inegai Pans. 1975.
26. Amin S. L "accumulation a Iechelle mondiale. Paris. 1970, p. 30.
27. O "Keohane R. Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and beyond In Political Science: The State of a Discipline. Washington. 1983.
28. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading. Addison-Wesley. 1979.
29. Badie B., Smouts M.-C. Le retoumement du monde. Sociologie la scene Internationale. Paris. 1992, p. 146.
30. Merle M. Sur la "problematique" de I "etude des relations Internationales en France. In: RFSP. 1983. No. 3.
31. Tyulin I.G. Foreign policy thought of modern France. M., 1988, p. 42.
32. Aron R Memoires. 50 ans de reflexion politique. Paris, 1983, p. 69.
33. Tsygankov P.A. Raymond Aron on political science and sociology of international relations // Power and Democracy. Foreign scientists about political science. Sat. M., 1992, p. 154-155.
34. Aron R. Paix et Guerre entre les nations. Avec une presentation inedite de I`autenr. Paris, 1984.
35. Derriennic J.-P. Esquisse de problematiqie pour une sociologie des relations intemationales. Grenoble, 1977, p. 11-16.
    The works of this Canadian scholar and follower of R. Aron (under whose guidance he wrote and defended his thesis on the problems of the sociology of international relations) rightfully belongs to the French school, although he is a professor at Lavaal University in Quebec.
36. Borthoul G. Paris. Traite de polemologie. Sociologie des querres. Paris.
37. BouthovI G., Carrere R., Annequen J.-L. Guerres et civilization. Paris, 1980
38. Analytical methods in the study of international relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Tyulina I.G., Kozhemyakova A.S. Khrustaleva M.A. M., 1982.
39. Lukin V.P. "Centers of Power": Concepts and Reality. M., 1983.
40. Shakhnazarov G.Kh. Change in the balance of forces between socialism and capitalism and the problem of peaceful coexistence // The Great Victory of the Soviet People. 1941-1945.Moscow, 1975.
41. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Ed. Gantman V.I. M., 1976.
42. Kosolapoe R.I. The social nature of international relations // World Economy and International Relations. 1979 # 7; N.V. Podolsky International relations and class struggle. M., 1982; Lenin's foreign policy and the development of international relations. M., 1983.
43. Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Ashina G.K., Tyulina I.G. M., 1982.
44. Burlatsky F.M., Galkin A.A. Sociology. Politics. International relationships. M., 1974, p. 235-236.
45. Vyatr E. Sociology of political relations. M., 1970, p. 11.
46. Ermolenko D.V. Sociology and problems of international relations (some aspects and problems of sociological research of international relations). M., 1977, p. 9.
47. Khrustalev M.A. Methodological problems of modeling international relations // Analytical methods and techniques in the study of international relations. M., 1982.
48. Pozdnyakov E.A., Shadrina I.N. On humanization and democratization of international relations // World Economy and International Relations. 1989. No. 4.
49. Pozdnyakov E.A. We ourselves have destroyed our house, we ourselves must raise it // World Economy and International Relations. 1992. No. 3-4.
50. Gorbachev M.S. Restructuring and new thinking for our country and for the whole world. M., 1987, p. 146.
51. Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. M., 1986, p. 6.
52. Gorbachev M.S. Socialist idea and revolutionary perestroika. M., 1989, p. 16.

Gorbachev M.S. October and perestroika: the revolution continues. M., 1987, p. 57-58.

Sometimes this trend is classified as utopianism (see for example: EH Carr. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956).

In most of the textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism as an independent theoretical direction is either not considered, or serves as nothing more than a "critical background" in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical directions.

Russian theory

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

WHAT SHOULD IT BE? *

A.P. Tsygankov

We, Russians, have not done anything for humanity precisely because we do not have, at least, the Russian view did not appear.

K.S. Aksakov

The time is ripe for a turn towards the study of reality in all its contradictions and the creation of its own theory, which would cease to see deviations and pathology in local features that cannot be accommodated in Western schemes.

Introduction

The Russian science of international relations is entering a special period of its development. In more than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet state, a significant path has been covered, a rich array of empirical and theoretical material has been mastered, a number of interesting concepts and approaches have been developed * 1. At the same time, considerable problems have emerged in the development of Russian discipline with ideological and material difficulties. Empirical research is still sluggish, while theoretical work suffers from excessive abstractness. The general crisis of the system of social sciences in Russia, partly associated with the collapse of the Marxist paradigm, tells

* A significant part of the ideas of the article is discussed in detail in:.

1 The development of Russian international studies was analyzed in more detail in:,.

HELL. Bogaturov

Xia and on the development of international studies. The world has changed significantly, leaving behind a strip of unipolar globalization and revealing a whole series of new economic, political and ethnocultural rifts2. Are we ready to comprehend it? Do we have the necessary methodological and theoretical tools for this? Are Russian foreign affairs officials capable of responding to the new challenges of the time?

This article proposes to comprehend the new world realities along the paths of the development of the Russian theory of international relations (RTMO). At a critical stage in the world development of theory, the initiative in defining the most important areas of empirical analysis and foreign policy practice could have taken place. Unfortunately, RTMO is still in the process of formation, often torn apart in

2 A detailed analysis of new phenomena in international relations was undertaken in Russia in recent works:,.

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contradictions and struggle of mutually exclusive approaches. Representatives of universalist and isolationist thinking have emerged among Russian international theoreticians. While the former believe that the main thing is to integrate as quickly as possible into the Western professional community of international affairs, the latter see this path as disastrous, seeing in it a rejection of their own value system and calling for intellectual autarchy. The well-known dispute between the Westerners and the native people is reflected in the discussion of the ways of development of the RTMO.

In inviting the reader to discuss possible ways of RTMO development, I proceed from the need to overcome these extremes. In part, this overcoming would be possible as a result of narrowing the gap that has developed in Russian university practice between the teaching of international relations (IR) and Russian political thought. If political scientists and philosophers study the history of political, including domestic, thought, then international affairs specialists most often take courses on the basics of Western theory of international relations. These areas need each other for further development, but they are divided into different divisions and faculties. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of one's own intellectual roots, which is impossible without the study of Russian thought. Without movement in this direction, a discussion normal for the development of RTMO between Westerners and native speakers will tend to excessive ideological

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logic, hindering the development of theory. If the indicated gap is overcome, then in Russia, over time, conditions could develop for the formation of national school in the global TMO. Such a school would arise at the junction of international relations and the history of Russian thought.

In the development of this thought, the article examines the tendencies of Westernization and ethnocentrism in the global TMT, as well as the essence of a new theoretical dispute about the possibility of forming a universal theory of world cognition. Against this global background, I propose to consider the issue of the formation of the RTMO, the growth points of which I see on the paths of turning to the traditions of Russian thought. When I criticize universalist positions, I in no way want to be understood as an isolationist. The danger of isolationism, although weakened over the past twenty years, has not yet been overcome, as evidenced by the actively developing conspiracy and pseudoscientific research outside the academic structures. At best, the isolationist tendency will delay the already protracted elaboration of answers to questions about Russian identity and the related development of the RTMO. At worst, it will return us to dogmatism that suffocates creative thought.

It is obvious to me that any TMT can develop fruitfully only in the process of an active dialogue between Russian researchers and their colleagues in Western and non Western countries Oh. I hope that it is in the course of such a dialogue that the originality of Russian thought will emerge, for, as Vladimir Soloviev wrote, “we inevitably impose

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our national imprint on everything we do. " I also hope that, reflecting on their contribution to the global intellectual community, Russian theorists will not forget about their responsibility for shaping the desired image of the future of the country and the world as a whole. After all, any social theory presupposes not only the analysis of facts, but also the creative construction of the image of society with its characteristic system of meanings and values.

Westernization and Ethnocentrism in TMO

Social cognition has long occupied the minds of social scientists. Discussions on this topic flare up and die down periodically, reflecting the ambivalence of belief in the universality and progressive growth of knowledge. In the twentieth century, the beginning of discussions was laid by theorists of the so-called "logical positivism", formulated by the followers of the Vienna Circle in Europe. The next major stage was the correction of logical positivism by Karl Popper with his "critical rationalism" and the desire to change the principles of testing scientific knowledge. The founder of critical rationalism, in particular, argued that knowledge cannot be scientific if it is formulated as non-falsifiable, i.e. if principles and conditions are not proposed under which the previous hypothesis will be considered incompetent. Then came the time of Thomas Kuhn's "scientific revolutions." Kuhn drew a strict distinction between "normal science" and scientific revolutions and pointed out the need to understand social and group conditions, dictating

transitions from one "paradigm" of normal science to another. Thus, the researcher came closer to his predecessors to the principles of the sociology of knowledge, a number of which were formulated long before him in Europe by Karl Mannheim and Max Weber.

According to the latter, the interpretation of public knowledge does not exclude, but presupposes an understanding of the socio-cultural characteristics of its formation. Discussions on the topic of the methodology of scientific knowledge continue, but the majority of representatives of the international community agree on the principle of the social conditionality of knowledge. Today, few people already believe in the scientist principles of "logical positivism" formulated within the framework of the Vienna Circle. And positivism itself has become more complex and interesting, going far beyond the limits of "logical positivism" and in general accepting criticism of the theory of absolute and universal truth. Social science is not free and cannot be free from ideology in the sense in which it was understood after Karl Marx by the sociologists Mannheim and Weber. As a part of public consciousness, social science actively reproduces and produces national ideologemes and myths. The social sciences cannot completely free themselves from these myths, although it is impossible not to strive for this.

Due to the indicated dependence of cognition on the characteristics of the cultural and ideological context, many social theories are ethnocentric in their essence. In anthropology and sociology, ethnocentrism is

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It is easy to define it as a belief in the "natural" superiority of one's own culture in relation to others3. Ethnocentric theory defends the values ​​of its culture and is based on the moral superiority of one cultural community over others. In this case, others are perceived as insufficiently civilized and posing a potential threat. Specialists in the development of science, including social science, have come to the conclusion that such a conviction is formed in the course of historical development and is rooted in the institutional, social and civilizational structures of society. Theories less ethnocentrically inclined define "their" moral values ​​as open to revaluation, rather than absolute and unchanging. At the same time, they view alternative communities not so much as a threat, but as a source of new knowledge.

Theories of international relations are also not free from ethnocentrism and are often based on the rigid premises of the culture that gave rise to them. As American political scientist Stanley Hoffman justly remarked, international relations are "American social science", reflecting and theoretically consolidating the vision of the world through the prism of Western civilization. Even more categorical was the British internationalist Edward Carr, who defined the Western science of international relations as “ the best way to rule the world from a position of strength ”. Obviously, no science is outside of time.

3 For a good overview of the literature, see:.

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nor space. The Western understanding of international relations has been formulated in relation to the realities of Western civilization and is not necessarily applicable to the rest of the world. In a world represented by a variety of cultural, ethnic, religious and regional traditions, it is generally difficult to imagine a unified understanding of international relations.

It is no coincidence that many theories developed within the framework of the Western intellectual tradition are poorly adapted to explain events taking place outside this part of the world. Let us recall, for example, that an attempt to instill the theory of "shock therapy" as a model of the transition to a market economy in Russian conditions ended with the recognition of the need for its (at least) modification. The widespread theories of democratic transition also proved to be far from universality and demonstrated the need to adapt to non-Western sociocultural conditions. Experts remember that a similar fate befell the theory of modernization. Finally, the theory of the democratic world is also ethnocentric. According to this theory, democracies are not at war with each other. However, the social roots of democracy can differ and do not always contribute to the establishment of peace. So, some of the democratizing regimes of Eurasia turned out to be militaristic, including in relation to each other.

Not all theories of international relations are equally ethnocentric, but all are in one way or another a reflection of national character and social

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cultural specificity of the country and cannot be mechanically transferred to another cultural soil. Therefore, the prospects for creating a kind of global international theory remain vague, because national and cultural differences have not disappeared anywhere and continue to determine the behavior of participants in world politics. Consequently, the most important for international experts is not only the question of whether an international theory is possible, but also the question of its national and cultural originality and the possibility of developing such a theory outside the Western "center". If international theory is not capable of formulating universally valid laws of behavior in world politics, then such a theory may seek to solve a more modest task - to identify national and cultural characteristics and traditions in the world system, proceeding from the understanding of such a system as globally pluralistic, and not globally -universal.

New theoretical controversy: is our knowledge of the world universal?

In light of the above, the recent and ongoing controversy in the theory of international relations is of particular interest. Its meaning is connected both with criticism of the ethnocentrism of Western theory and with the clarification of the question of whether a universal theory of social knowledge about the world is possible. This dispute is a continuation and logical development of the already held disputes in the TMO.

Earlier controversies can be summed up as a movement from controversy among Western experts to a gradual

connecting representatives of the critical direction and scientists working outside the western region to the theory of international relations. In the first third of the twentieth century. a discussion was actively developing between idealists who advocated the prohibition of wars through international law and realists who denied such a possibility. In the middle of the century, the debate about the principles of world order was supplemented by a debate about research methodology. Many internationalists have come to believe in modernist or quantitative methods of collecting and analyzing information about the world. In this dispute, the modernists were opposed by traditionalists, or supporters of traditional historical and legal approaches. Finally, in the last third of the century, representatives of the critical and post-structuralist direction became more active, attacking the mainstream for its conservatism and inability to rethink international relations in connection with the emergence and development of new social movements in the world. Postmodernists, feminists, Marxists and others have questioned the traditional rationalist-oriented TMO and its methods of comprehending the processes taking place in the world. In the 1980s. The response to the challenge of poststructuralism in Europe and the United States was the emergence of a constructivist trend that began to study social norms, ideas and identities4.

At the beginning of the XX! v. the backlog of representatives of the post-structuralist direction

4 On disputes in the theory of international relations, see:.

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lechings have made it possible for scholars to question the monopoly of Western knowledge of international relations. Already in the last quarter of the twentieth century, through the efforts of Hayward Alker and his followers, the question of the political hegemony and intellectual provinciality of the American theories of the MO was sharply raised. Later, these efforts led to the activation of supporters of pluralization of the processes of knowledge of the world. Arlene Tickner, Ole Waver and David Blainey, who teach international relations in Colombia, continental Europe and the United States respectively, have initiated a series of books on the development of TMT in various parts of the world. Helene Pelerin has edited a French-language book on Overcoming Anglo-American Centrism in International Relations. John Hobson has published an important book analyzing the colonial Eurocentrism of Western theories of international relations. In addition, among the theorists of the Ministry of Defense there has increased interest in the problems of civilization, civilizational identity and their influence on the formation of views about the world.

A new controversy in theory unfolds against the backdrop of growing changes in the socio-political practice of international relations. Like any discussion in the social sciences, the debate about overcoming Westernization and Western colonial heritage is difficult to understand without understanding its social roots. The roots of this dispute should be sought in the gradual formation of a new world order, which is based on the disintegration of the unipolar

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global dominance in the world of the United States and Western civilization in general. This process, launched by the terrorist attack of Islamic radicals Al-Qaeda in September 2001, was continued by the growth of China and other non-Western powers that undermined the economic dominance of the West and manifested itself in both the material weakening of Western civilization and the steady decline of its monopoly on the use of force in the world. First, the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, and then the civil war in Syria, demonstrated the inability of the United States and its allies to limit the use of force by others (including against closest partners), as well as to mobilize for its use in the face of opposition from Russia, China and other large powers.

Against this socio-political background, a controversy is developing between the new supporters of a universal knowledge of the world and the defenders of a pluralistic vision of the world and TMO. Universalists proceed from the ontological unity of the world, which requires the formation of uniform rational standards for its comprehension. Representatives of the liberal and realistic trend in the Western TMO consider a global peace with its characteristic uniform principles of behavior of states and the settlement of international disputes to be valid. For liberals, it is about the formation of international institutions, while realists emphasize the military dimension of the world order and the leading role of the United States in maintaining the international balance of power that is optimal for the West. But both of them are convinced that

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the unity of the world implies the unity of the principles of its cognition, and ontological universalism must be supplemented by epistemological one. As for the attempts of China and other non-Western cultures to form their own approaches or schools of TMT, they are seen as untenable, since they call into question the principles of the universality of scientific knowledge (analysis, verification, etc.) and, therefore, tend to self-isolation. For example, the American researcher Jack Snyder expressed his readiness to study Confucianism as a necessity to comprehend the Chinese strategic culture, but denied him the right to act as the philosophical foundation of the special Chinese school in the TMO.

Attempts to formulate alternative schools of theorizing are criticized not only by Western realists and liberals, but also by some representatives of the post-structuralist trend in the TMO. Not being supporters of Westernization and Western-style universalism, they nevertheless speak out in defense of the same unified principles of scientific verification, doubting the productivity of both the formation of national schools in TMT and the very dialogue of “Western” and “non-Western” approaches. For example, for the British researcher Kimberly Hutchins, the very opposition of the "Western" to the "non-Western" excludes the possibility of dialogue and, at the end, is not able to give anything but endless mutual criticism, new opposition and the strengthening of provincialism.

As for the critics of the globally universalist vision, they

accept the pluralization of the TMT as a natural reflection of the pluralization of the world itself, with its diversity of power, social and cultural relations. The roots of this position can be easily identified in the works of representatives of various trends in social and international political thought. Thus, some representatives of the realistic direction, like the one already cited by Karr, believe that knowledge is not free from politics, but, on the contrary, is included in the system of power relations in the world. Consequently, the objectivity of cognition is hampered by the inequality of the parties, and the claims to universalism, in fact, seek to consolidate the power interests and positions of the strong. Proponents of Frankfurt critical theory, like Jurgen Habermas, go even further, considering progressive theory to be the basis of social and political transformation of society. As for the already mentioned representatives of the sociology of knowledge, the analysis of the sociocultural boundaries of universalism and the social context of the functioning of ideas remains immutable for them. Finally, theorists working in the postcolonial tradition see in the pursuit of universalism an inability to understand the Other and a desire to rule over him5 * *.

Does this mean that critics of universalism refuse to participate in the formation of a unified TMO? Some of them will probably be prepared to make statements like Friedrich Nietzsche and the representatives of French postmodernism, according to which not only

5 A more detailed analysis of the literature contains

lives in:.

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God, but the author has died, which means that the texts no longer carry any semantic load. Some will speak out in favor of the impossibility of common knowledge, pointing out the eternity of the confrontation between the great powers in world politics. However, many continue to rely on the importance of preserving the overall TMT as a fundamental scientific reference point. For them, a global-pluralistic vision of the world not only does not exclude, but also presupposes, a striving for common epistemological guidelines, however, the presence of a dialogue of different approaches is perceived as an indispensable condition for such striving. It is necessary to be aware of the fact that on the way to the formation of a unified TMT there are many serious obstacles, which include, in particular, narrowed standards of rationality and epistemology. Recent studies by TMT methodologists have shown that the very understanding of science in ML should be significantly expanded6. There are also proposals to expand epistemological boundaries, going beyond the boundaries of academic social science and showing openness to various philosophical studies focused on the production of knowledge about the world.

Does RTMO exist? 7

The dispute about the nature of knowledge about the world finds its continuation among the growing

6 The American researcher Patrick Jackson has identified the functioning of four scientific traditions of neopositivism, critical realism, reflexivism and analyticism, see:.

7 In this section, I am partly based on a survey I have conducted of Russian international theorists. The survey results will be presented in more detail in a separate article.

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siysk theorists MO. Today we can talk about the formation of two polar positions.

First, in Russian discussions, one can clearly hear the voices of universalists, whose position is close to the point already described above for the position of Western supporters of the globally universal TMT. Critically assessing the state of Russian science of international relations, Russian universalists associate it with insufficiently active efforts to connect to global science. Some of them consider the stage of mastering the world experience in the study of ML as largely complete, but at the same time do not see in Russian studies the diversity and discussions necessary for theoretical development, complaining about the dominance of realistic and geopolitical approaches. The majority, however, are convinced that the assimilation of world experience is still ahead, because only integration into the international professional community can lead Russian science out of the dead ends of isolationist development and attempts to form "its own" theories8. It is not surprising that the attitude of the representatives of this group to the idea of ​​creating a Russian school of international education is negative. It sees unsupported ambitions, tendencies towards epistemological isolationism, and attempts to exert ideological pressure on science, similar to the Soviet one.

Second, there is an isolationist attitude in Russian academic and political discussions.

8 A. Makarychev's answer to the survey questionnaire. Published with permission from the author.

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zition, which is the object of criticism from the universalists. We are talking about those representatives of Russian thought inside and outside the academic community who remain convinced that everything that Russia needs for its intellectual development has basically already been created, and mainly by the Russians themselves. We have already written about the tendency towards isolationism in the Russian science of the Ministry of Defense, rooted in the Russian superiority / inferiority complex. There are many in the Russian intellectual community who are convinced both of their possession of the truth and of the need to develop purely Russian science in order to ensure the importance of confronting the “hostile” West. It is curious that, while rejecting Western poststructuralist approaches as alien to the Eurasian and Orthodox values ​​of Russia, representatives of this group are actively borrowing Western traditionalist geopolitical theories. A fresh example of creativity of representatives of this group is the recent book by the founder of the neo-Eurasian direction of Russian geopolitics Alexander Dugin "International Relations". The author of the book demonstrates knowledge of various directions of TMT, however, in constructing his theory of a multipolar world, he relies on Samuel Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski and other traditionalist theorists of geopolitical and geocultural thought.

The positions identified are polar opposites, without fully capturing the essence of the problem faced by the RTMO.

Over a twenty-year period of development, Russian international theoreticians have proposed and developed a number of original approaches and concepts in understanding world trends and foreign policy9. Therefore, it is legitimate to say that today RTMO has formed as a scientific direction. At the same time, the serious difficulties that this direction is experiencing in its development are also obvious. It is difficult to disagree with the universalists that these difficulties are partly due to the still weak integration of Russian scientists into the global community of international experts. There are many intellectual, institutional and financial facets to this topic, each of which should be seriously discussed. But it must also be recognized that intellectual adaptation to the conditions of the global world is unlikely to be successful without mobilizing its own traditions of social thinking. Russian foreign affairs officials should pay attention to the fact that Russia has its own and long-developing roots of thinking about the world. This side of the problem deserves special mention, especially since its solution is unlikely to require the mobilization of significant financial resources.

It seems to me that over the past few centuries Russia has developed a huge, albeit scattered, array of theoretical knowledge, which may well become the basis for the formation of the Russian school in the TMO. From a historical point of view, RTMO

9 For more details see:.

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has already developed as a system of thinking about the world. This situation falls under the definition of TMT, which Alker and his colleagues proposed at one time and according to which international theory is a system of scientific and culturally rooted ideas and reflections about the world. Western ideas about the world, which are based on the concept of the absence of a legitimizing center (anarchy), also fall under this definition, however, the theory of anarchy loses the aura of universality attributed to it by a significant part of Western international affairs experts, while retaining its significance within the framework of this community of scientists. Outside the Western world, variants of the international theory of a different nature have developed and continue to develop. It seems that there are no serious reasons to take the ideas of the world of Muslim, Orthodox and other theologians and thinkers, who place the problem of values ​​and proper behavior at the center of the theory of international relations, outside the bounds of the theory of international relations. Moreover, not only social scientists, but also practicing diplomats and politicians proceed from these ideas.

As for the RTMO, there are not one, but three traditions worthy of attention in international theorists10. Its representatives are guided, respectively, by imitation of the West (Westernism), the preservation of independent statehood (statehood) and an original system of cultural values ​​(tertiaryism). By tradition, I mean continuity

10 See details in:.

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notion of the development of international relations, developing over several centuries of Russian history. Each of the traditions or schools of thought has developed its own images of Russia and the world system, which, despite all historical modifications, have retained their internal continuity and differences from each other.

Typical, for example, are the differences between Westerners, sovereigns and third parties in their understanding of freedom, the state and the world system. Russian Westernism is convinced of the priority value of freedom, which it understands as the liberation of the individual and which it finds in the West, but not in Russia. Convinced of the irresistible desire for individual liberation, Westerners consider Western civilization the most developed and viable, and the rest of the world - developing in the direction of reproducing the basic values ​​of the West. The primary task of the state, therefore, is to create conditions of freedom, contributing to the prosperity and development of the individual. Such views differ significantly from those formed within the boundaries of the other two traditions of Russian international theory - domination and third-partyness. The sovereigns interpret freedom as political independence, insisting on the priority of a strong and powerful state. Since the world is perceived by them as an endless struggle for power, the sovereigns are convinced that without a strong state Russia will not be able to survive and survive. Finally, for those who see an independent culture and civilization in Russia (Third

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Rome), all other goals are secondary. In their opinion, not political freedom and independence, but spiritual liberation should be considered as the main domestic and international priority.

None of the presented traditions is internally homogeneous, and each develops in polemics with each other and is influenced by various representatives of Western thought. For example, earlier Westernism developed under the influence of Catholic thought, and later, depending on its varieties, under the influence of Charles Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other European philosophers. The sovereigns, too, were greatly influenced by Western ideas, and many of them admired the European diplomacy of Clemens Metternich and Otto Bismarck, as well as the American diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Even the distinctive Third-Dimensional tradition of Russian thought has been significantly influenced by Western ideas - from German romanticism to American theorists of the pluralism of civilizations.

Today, for the further development of RTMO, it is necessary to more actively mobilize the body of theoretical knowledge accumulated by Russian thought.

Need

and the possibility of developing RTMO

For the further development of RTMO, new intellectual guidelines, resources and development impulses are needed. First of all, the Russian community of international affairs needs a discussion about the need to form

vaniya national school in the global TMO. Regardless of the results, the very fact of such a discussion could become an impetus for the development of the RTMO. Russian science MO continues to live in many respects by borrowing Western theories, without questioning the nature and consequences of such borrowing. Meanwhile, the need to learn from the West (and not only from it) does not cancel, but presupposes the need to reflect on the possibilities and limits of such borrowing in the interests of preserving the historically formed Russian identity and value system.

The need for further development of the "Russian view" (Aksakov) is conditioned by a number of peculiarities of the geographical, sociocultural and political-economic position of Russia in the world. First, the development of the RTMO cannot but leave its imprint on the country's deep uniqueness, which has become an alloy of a number of characteristics: predominantly Orthodox religion, the breadth of space and geopolitical challenges along the perimeter of long land borders, an intercivilizational cultural situation, pre-Westphalian imperial roots, semi-periphery in the system of global economic ties, the anti-bourgeois nature of the mass social strata, and much more. Secondly, the need to develop RTMO is dictated by the realities of global competition. If Carr was right that Western theory of international relations teaches the West the art of managing the world from a position of strength, then the development of international theory outside the United States and Europe is

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an indispensable condition for achieving global political equilibrium. It has long been said that those who do not want to feed their army will feed someone else's. Unwillingness to invest the necessary resources in the development of TMT will inevitably result in the fact that Russians will lose their independent system of views and values. Such a system has evolved in Russia over the centuries, helping it more than once to respond to international challenges. Today, such a challenge is the emergence of a multipolar world. If the Russian leadership claims to make a significant contribution to the formation of this world, then there is no alternative to the formation of a national international theory.

In this regard, it is possible to formulate two hypotheses concerning the development of the RTMO and national social science in the context of increased global information openness. First, the more peculiar the culture of the country, the more active will be the efforts of the intellectual class to create and develop a national model of soft power and the development of social sciences in order to adapt to the conditions of the global world. Second: the stronger the pressure to borrow foreign cultural ideas (and with them the values), the more significant should be the country's material resources spent on maintaining its own intellectual autonomy and resisting the danger of ideological colonization.

It seems that Russia can and should play an important role in the process of forming a global pluralistic theory of international relations. Those who doubt the validity of such a statement may

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point out that international relations as a subject of teaching and a scientific discipline have been developing in Russia relatively recently, only since the end of the Cold War, and, therefore, are much less developed than disciplines such as political science, sociology or economics. But the youthfulness of the teaching discipline of international relations does not mean that thinking about the world is something fundamentally new for Russians. These reflections, which have evolved over many centuries, should be considered a cumulative contribution to the RTMO. If they do not seem to someone quite harmonious and systematized, then perhaps these reflections should be taken as a basis for the development of a national theory of international relations?

The RTMO, which is taking shape today, will have to turn to Russian roots, which are deep and diverse. At the same time, it is important to take into account not only the socio-cultural originality of the social sciences, but also the striving to overcome contextual dependence, which is organic for any theory. Any theory is strong in attempts to rise above the description and to reveal the general trends in the development of the subject. Consequently, it should be developed not only on the basis of national disputes, but also through its constant comparison with the processes of development of other schools of international theory. Optimal for Russia is the path of dialogue with the dominant and critical areas of international theory in the West and in the East. It is especially important to balance Russian reflections on the world with Western concepts and theories,

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since the latter are the most systematized and analytically developed. The assimilation of the Western intellectual heritage is the most important condition for the development of Russian social science. Such assimilation was and always will be a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for the progress of Russian knowledge.

Thus, the path to the formation of Russian international theory in many respects lies through the recreation of the intellectual traditions of thinking about the world, starting from the time of the emergence of the Russian state. The presence of such traditions in a state with a thousand-year history is hardly subject to any doubt. For more than a century, Russians have been pondering and arguing about how to interact with the world, asking questions about national borders, the nature of the Eurasian environment and the system of international relations, the specifics of gaining knowledge about the world, the nature of violence and the principles of the relationship between man and nature. All these and many other questions relate to the subject of international relations, and therefore, it is quite possible to try to reconstruct the options for understanding them in Russian conditions.

RTMO: image of the desired future

Building an international theory in Russia should be guided by an understanding of the existing conditions for the development of the country and the world and what solutions were proposed by Russian thought in similar conditions. There are three cash, relatively long-term conditions of world development. First, it is the political and eco-

nomic instability of the world. Secondly, it is the need for new foreign technologies and investments in the national economy, dictated by the tasks of Russian modernization. Third, the ongoing crisis of Russian identity and the weakening of the system of Russian values. Each of these conditions was discussed in the Russian international theory, and different traditions and schools offered their own ways of responding to them. The sovereigns drew attention to the developing system of alliances and poles in the world, the Westerners talked about modernization, and the third ones about the revival of values. Although it would be impossible to fully synthesize the recommendations of various traditions - the conceptual and ideological differences existing between them are too deep - modern international theory should strive for the most integral understanding of the conditions noted. Only such integration can become a reliable compass for movement in the global world.

In conclusion, I will outline only one of the possible syntheses of various traditions of Russian thinking in order to form the image of the desired global future. From the point of view of the three noted conditions of Russian development, it would be optimal to combine moderate isolationism and pragmatic cooperation with the outside world in order to create conditions for internal modernization and overcoming the value crisis. The first two conditions indicate the need for international thought to develop opportunities for creating a low-cost security system and spheres of global

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attraction of investments into the Russian economy. The third condition indicates the need to form a sufficient material and ideological space for a broad discussion of the issue of values. The question of which of the Russian values ​​should be mobilized and developed in modern conditions for the arrangement of Russia and the world should become central in Russian international theory. I think that in discussing this issue, it is important to understand the relative independence of one's system of values ​​from the values ​​of other peoples and civilizations. Russian values ​​and cultural orientations cannot be summed up in terms of "West", "Eurasia", "Euro-East", etc. These concepts tend to belittle the cultural purpose of Russia, a country with centuries of experience, a special geopolitical identity and the mission of maintaining the cultural, civilizational and political balance in the world. It is also obvious that Russian values ​​are deeper than the orientations determined by the elites and relate to the people as a whole, acting as the main subject and goal of all reforms and foreign policy undertakings undertaken by the authorities.

At the same time, there is no reason to oppose one system of value orientations to another: in a transcontinental country, such as Russia, Westernism can be combined and even organically combined with fruitful cooperation with other parts of the world system. Russia can move closer to both the West and the East, while remaining Russia. Consciousness of oneself as a civilization with an independent system of political

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economic, historical and cultural values ​​does not mean that Russia does not have common values ​​with other countries and regions. Civilizations not only compete, but also intersect and actively interact with each other. Russia, as a country located at the geographical intersection of the West, East and Asia, has special opportunities for dialogue with others. Value systems can be built at different levels. In some aspects it will be easier for Russia to find a common language with some countries, and in others with others. For example, in matters of human rights and liberal democracy, friction with Western countries will be inevitable, but Russia has a lot in common with the West in terms of shared history, culture and aspiration to create a responsible state. Similar value hierarchies should be built in relations with other countries. In general, the world of values ​​will not resemble Huntington's picture of the clash of civilizations, but a complex picture of their intersection and hierarchical interaction.

In terms of content, Russian values ​​should be formulated not as contradicting the ideals of great power or Westernism, but as making their realization possible on a broader cultural and civilizational basis. Sovereignty and the desire for democracy must be integrated into the Russian system of values ​​as necessary, albeit insufficient, conditions. Democracy should not be abandoned, but built into your cultural context and system of

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national priorities. By the way, outside of Western countries, democracy plays a significant role, but is rarely at the center of state development. Indeed, along with democracy and the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, the state is obliged to guarantee stability, the implementation of significant social programs and security from external threats.

Over time, on the basis of a broad discussion, a new concept of Russian values ​​will be developed. Bearing in mind what has already been done in the Russian original theory, it is obvious that such a concept will take into account the ideas of spiritual freedom, social justice

and trans-ethnic unity. Once formulated, Russian values ​​will not only become a guide to practical action, but will also be spelled out in the Russian foreign policy doctrine as subject to protection and dissemination, just as the values ​​of liberal democracy are spelled out in the US foreign policy doctrine. Over time, it will become possible to focus not only on upholding, but also on the active dissemination of Russian values ​​in the world. Without such an orientation, foreign policy is doomed to an ideologically defensive nature, responding to the challenges of Western and other civilizations.

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Russian theory of international relations: what should it be?

Tsygankov Andrey Pavlovich, Professor, Department of International Relations and Political Science, State University of San Francisco, Ph.D.

Annotation. In the development of Russian international studies, a number of problems arise associated with the weak development of empirical research and the excessive abstractness of theoretical works. The article proposes to comprehend the development of the Russian theory of international relations (RTMO) to overcome new economic, political and ethnocultural rifts. RTMO is still in the process of formation, often torn apart by contradictions and struggles of mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of the need to overcome extreme approaches by narrowing the gap between the teaching of international relations (MO) and Russian political thought. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of one's own intellectual roots, which is impossible without the study of Russian thought.

Key words: MO, RTMO, universalist approach, isolationist approach, Russian political thought.

Russia International Relations Theory: What Should it be Like?

Andrei Tsygankov, Professor Chair of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, Ph.D.

Abstract. Russian IR theory faces many difficulties including underdevelopment of empiric research and overall abstract approach of theoretic studies. The article suggests to reconsider the development of the Russian IR theory in order to face the new economic, political and ethno-cultural challenges. The formation of Russian IR theory is still underway, and it is characterized by contradictions and the presence of mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of overcoming the extreme approaches in the IR theory through reducing the gap between the teaching of IR and Russian political thought. The article concludes that the development of IR in Russia requires deep knowledge of its intellectual roots, thus the study of the Russian political thought becomes the necessity.

Key words: IR, Russian International relations theory, universalistm, solationalism, Russian political thought.

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36. International Relations Scholarship around the World, ed. by A.B. Tickner and O. W ver. London, 2009; Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D. L. Blaney 2012; Claiming the International, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2013.

37. Jackson P.T. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. London, 2011.

38. Knutsen O. A history of international relations theory. Manchester, 1997.

39. La Perspective en Relations internationals / ed. Helene Pellerin. Montreal, 2010.

40. Makarychev A. and V. Morozov. Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of ​​Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR // International Studies Review 2013. Vol. 15.P. 332, 335.

41. Nayak M. and E. Selbin. Decentering International Relations. London, 2010.

42. Non-Western International Relations Theory, edited by A. Acharya and B. Buzan. London, 2010.

43. Shani G. Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and critical International Relations theory // International Studies Review. 2008. Vol. 10. No. 4.

44. Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein. London, 2012.

45. Snyder J. Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory // Paper presented at the annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28, 2008, p. ten.

46. ​​Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2012.

47. Tickner A. Core, periphery and (neo) imperialist International Relations // European Journal of International Relations. 2013.19.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014 83

The above diversity has greatly complicated the problem of classification of modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by certain authors.

So, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, highlighting the Anglo-Saxon concepts, the Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the "third world" (8).

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicit theories (such as political realism and philosophy of history) and private hypotheses and methods (to which the behavioral school is attributed) (9). Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author Philippe Briar refers to the general theories of political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations. As for private theories, among them are named: the theory of international actors (Bagat Korani); theory of interactions within international systems (George Modelski, Samir Amin; Karl Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace exploration (Lucy-en Poirier, David Singer, Johan Galtuig); integration theory (Amitai Etzioni; Karl Deutsch); theories of international organization (Inis Claude; Jean Siotis; Ernst Haas) (10).

Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers, and, from this point of view, they focus on polemics between representatives of the traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations (11, 12).

The fourth is based on the identification of the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, highlighting the main and turning points in the development of science (13).

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist Bagat Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations on the basis of the methods they use (“classical” and “modernist”) and the conceptual vision of the world (“liberal-pluralistic” and “materialism”).

chesko-structuralist "). As a result, he singles out such directions as political realism (G. Morgenthau; R. Aron; H. Ball), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx; F. Engels; V. I. Lenin ) and neo-Marxism (or the school of "dependence": I. Wallerstein; S. Amin; A. Frank; F. Cardoso) (14). Likewise, Daniel Colliard dwells on the classical theory of the "state of nature" (ie, political realism); the theory of the "international community" (or political idealism); the Marxist ideological trend and its many interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French school of international relations (15). Marcel Merle believes that the main trends in modern science of international relations are represented by traditionalists - the heirs of the classical school (Hans Morgenthau; Stanley Hoffmann; Henry Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (Robert Cox; David Singer;

Morton Kaplan; David Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (Paul Baran; Paul Sweezy; Samir Amin) currents (16).

Examples of different classifications of modern theories of international relations could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant points. First, any of these classifications is conditional and is not able to exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations1. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their "blood relationship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, contrary to the still encountered and today the opposite opinion, there is every reason to talk about the outlined synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual "compromise" between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we will confine ourselves to a brief consideration of such directions (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-Marxism.

“However, they do not set themselves such a goal. Their goal is different - to comprehend the state and theoretical level achieved by the science of international relations, by summarizing the existing conceptual approaches and comparing them with what was done earlier.

The legacy of Thukidwda, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Watgel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vitoria, Greece, Kant, on the other, found its direct reflection in that major scientific discussion that arose in the United States during the period between the two World Wars, discussions between realists and idealists. | Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical origins, in the capacity of which are utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. conflicts between states through legal regulation and democratization of international relations, spreading the norms of morality and justice. regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations promoting the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange.One of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument international politics. In political practice, idealism found its embodiment in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Woodrow Wilson (17), in the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), which provides for the refusal to use force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stimeson doctrine (1932), according to which the United States renounces diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the postwar years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State John F. Dulles and Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) and President George W. Bush (1988-1992). In the scientific literature, it was presented, in particular, by the book of such American authors as R. Clarke and L.B. Dream "Achievement of the world through world law." The book proposes a step-by-step project

"Sometimes this trend is qualified as utopianism (see, for example: CarrE.H. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956.

disarmament and the creation of a system of collective security for the whole world for the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between peoples should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution (18). Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors (19). The idea of ​​a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII - "Pacem in terns" or 04.16.63, Paul VI - "Populorum progressio" from 03.26.67, as well as John Paul II - from 02.12.80, who is still performing today for the creation of "political power endowed with universal competence."

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds today. Moreover, it can be said that in recent years its influence on some aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis of practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world an order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects - to this day1) was considered to have lost all influence, and in any case - hopelessly lagging behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it was deeply undermined by the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was the revival on American soil of the European classical tradition with its inherent advancement in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as "strength" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict".

Political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, but also pointed out, in particular, the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time

"In the majority of textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism as an independent theoretical direction is either not considered, or serves as nothing more than a" critical background "in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical directions.

me to a large extent contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War - but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives - Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederic Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Wal-phers and others - have long defined the path of the science of international relations. The undisputed leaders of this trend were Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron.

1 The work of G. Morgenthau "Political relations between the nations] Mi. The Struggle for Power ", the first edition of which was published in 1948, has become a kind of" bible "for many generations (D || aent-political scientists both in the United States and in other countries" "JSffaaa. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau international relations are an arena of acute confrontation between states. In the backdrop of all the international activities of the latter lies their desire to increase their power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. The term "power" is understood in the broadest sense: as a military and the economic power of the state, a guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, opportunities for the dissemination of its ideological attitudes and spiritual values.The two main ways in which the state secures its power, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy are military strategy and diplomacy The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means. ive, there is a peaceful power struggle. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest." The result of the desire of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests is the establishment in the world arena of a certain equilibrium (balance) of power (force), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. In fact, the state of the world is precisely the state of the balance of power between states.

According to Morgenthau, there are two factors that are capable of keeping states' aspirations for power within some framework - international law and morality. However, to trust them too much in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealistic school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being solved with the help of collective security mechanisms or

by the UN. Projects for the harmonization of national interests by creating a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hopefully avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from the six principles of political realism, which he substantiates already at the very beginning of his book (20). In short, they look like this.

1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, there is the possibility of creating a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws - albeit only relatively and partially. Such a theory allows us to separate objective truth in international polygon from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international polygon and the facts to be learned. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Thus, this notion avoids two mistakes. First, judgments about a politician's interest based on motives, not on the basis of his behavior. And, secondly, the derivation of the politician's interest from his ideological or moral preferences, and not from his "official duties."

Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. Rational polygon is the right policy because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept "interest expressed in terms of power" is not unchanged. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the international policy of the state is being formed. This also applies to the concepts of "power" and "political equilibrium", as well as to such an initial concept designating the main actor in international politics as "state-nation".

Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change

modern world. He is convinced that such a change can be carried out only through the skillful use of objective laws that operated in the past and will operate in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time he is aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. They must be considered in the specific circumstances of time and place. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!" It cannot afford to commit suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. Political realism refuses to equate the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral norms. It is one thing to know that nations obey the moral law in their policies, and quite another to claim knowledge of what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. The theory of political realism is based on a pluralistic concept of human nature. A real man is both an "economic man" and a "moral man" and a "religious man", etc. Only a "political man" is like an animal, for he has no "moral brakes." Only a "moral man" is a fool, since he is devoid of caution. Only

* PeJEDi ^^ fe ^ thLhuman "> can only be a saint, because he has ^ d ^ Ynv ^^ desires.

Taking this into account, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from the others and occurs in its own terms.

As we will see from the subsequent presentation, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents - and, moreover, opponents - of this trend. At the same time, his conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, the desire for an impartial and strict analysis

lis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and based on fruitless and dangerous illusions - all this contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment and in the circles of statesmen in various countries.

However, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. From the very beginning, its serious shortcomings prevented its transformation into the central link, the cementing beginning of a unified theory.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a "natural state" of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism essentially reduces these relations to interstate relations, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state, as interpreted by political realists, look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves look like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical response to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong while others are weak. No wonder one of the influential adherents of political realism A. Wolfers built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table (21). The absolutization of the role of power and the underestimation of the importance of other factors - for example, such as spiritual values, sociocultural realities, etc. - significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations, reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true since the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its striving to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has become, in fact, a hostage of its own approach. He did not take into account the very important trends and the changes that have already taken place, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena up to the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, one more circumstance was overlooked: the fact that these changes require the use, along with traditional, and new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All of this drew criticism in hell-

rhe political realism on the part of adherents of other approaches, and, first of all, on the part of representatives of the so-called modernist direction and various theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to the growing awareness of the need to complement the political analysis of international realities with a sociological one.

Representatives of modernism *, or "scientific" direction in the analysis of international relations, most often without touching upon the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The controversy between "modernists" and "traditionalists" reaches a particular intensity since the 1960s, having received the name "new big dispute" in the scientific literature (see, for example: 12 and 22). The source of this controversy was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (Quincy Wright, Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Kalevi Holsti, Ernst Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematical tools, formalization, to modeling, data collection and processing, to empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the intuition of the researcher, judgments by analogy, etc. ... This approach, which emerged in the United States, touched upon the study of not only international relations, but also other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil back in the 19th century.

Indeed, even Sei-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods already tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, an appropriate technical base that gives researchers new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by the rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of inter-

international relations, the denial of both any "metaphysical prejudices" and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as M. Merle emphasizes (see: 16, pp. 91-92), such an approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposing models, between which social scientists also hesitate. On the one hand, this is Charles Darwin's teaching about the merciless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation. On the other hand, there is the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the United States followed the second path - the path of assimilating society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, with the transition then to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to the problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to to your surroundings. In the legacy of organicism, according to M. Merle, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on the study of the behavior of the characters, the other - the articulation of various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and the systems approach in the science of international relations (see: ibid., P. 93).

Being a reaction to the shortcomings of the traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become any homogeneous trend - neither in theoretical nor in methodological terms. What he has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and to increase the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which causes the actual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivity. Nevertheless, many studies of adherents of the modernist direction turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also very significant

our conclusions drawn on their basis. It is also important to note the fact that they opened up the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then the representatives of transnationalism (Robert O. Cohein, Joseph Nye), theories of integration (David Mitrany) and interdependence (Ernst Haas, David Moors) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. The role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and power for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage, turned out to be at the center of the new "big dispute" that erupted in the late 60s - early 70s.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward the general idea that political realism and its inherent statist paradigm do not correspond to the nature and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and military confrontation. The state, as an international actor, loses its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The variety of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and "channels" (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them, push the state out of the center of international communication , contribute to the transformation of such communication from “international” (ie, interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) into “transnational * (ie, carried out in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond the framework of interstate interactions led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scientists J. Nye and R. Kohei write in the preface to their book “Transnational Relations and World Politics”.

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, transformation of the situation in world markets, an increase in the number of

and the importance of transnational corporations has stimulated the emergence of new trends in the world arena. The predominant among them are: the outstripping growth of world trade in comparison with world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes is the increasing interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations (23). Proponents of transnationalism1 are often inclined to view the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, which can be analyzed using the same methods that make it possible to understand and explain the processes taking place in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, therefore, many of the provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (24). At the same time, his undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism, with its inherent tendencies to overestimate the real significance of the observed trends in changing the nature of international relations, left its imprint on him. Some similarity of the provisions put forward by transnationalism with a number of provisions defended by the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations is also noticeable.

Representatives of neo-Marxism (Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Arjiri Immanuel, Immanuel Wallerstein, etc.) - a trend as heterogeneous as transnationalism, is also united by the idea of ​​the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in assessing its future. At the same time, the starting point and the basis of their conceptual constructions is the idea of ​​the asymmetry of the interdependence of modern

"Among them can be named not only many scientists in the United States, Europe and other regions of the world, but also famous political figures - for example, such as the former French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, influential nongovernmental political organizations and research centers - for example. Palme Commission, Brandt Commission, Club of Rome, etc.

world and, moreover, about the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, about the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the colonial countries had previously gained their political independence. This is manifested in the inequality of economic exchanges and uneven development (25).

For example, the "center", within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends in its development on the raw materials and resources of the "periphery". In turn, the periphery countries are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. Thus, they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the end, "economic growth based on integration into the world market is underdeveloped development ™" (26).

In the seventies, this approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the Third World countries of the idea of ​​the need to establish a new world economic order. Under pressure from these countries, which make up the majority of the member states of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year - a Charter on the economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has its own strengths and weaknesses, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, the enrichment of the science of international relations in general. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of one over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Greyko, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time

it is only about enriching it, taking into account the new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical trends. It is significant that one of the longest-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohein, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism "strength", "national interest", rational behavior, etc. - remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations (27). On the other hand, K. Waltz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach at the expense of the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of conclusions, the need for which the supporters of the traditional view, as a rule, rejected.

The emergence of the school of neorealism in International Relations is associated with the publication of K. Waltz's book "Theory of International Politics", the first edition of which was published in 1979 (28). Defending the main provisions of political realism (the "natural state" of international relations, rationality in the actions of the main actors, national interest as their main motive, the desire to possess power), its author at the same time criticizes his predecessors for failing to create a theory of international politics as an autonomous discipline. He criticizes Hans Morgenthau for identifying foreign policy with international politics, and Raymond Aron for his skepticism about the possibility of creating international relations as an independent theory.

Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, to take the existence of a global system, and not the states that are its elements, as its starting point, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.

At the same time, the systemic nature of international relations is due, according to K. Waltz, not to the actors interacting here, not their main features (associated with geographic location, demographic potential, socio-cultural specifics, etc.), but by the properties of the structure of the international system. (In this regard, neorealism is often qualified as structural realism or simply structuralism.) Being a consequence of the interactions of international actors, the structure of the international system at the same time is not reduced to a simple sum of such interactions, but is

is an independent phenomenon that can impose certain restrictions on states, or, on the contrary, offer them favorable opportunities on the world stage.

It should be emphasized that, according to neo-realism, the structural properties of the international system do not actually depend on any efforts of small and medium-sized states, being the result of interactions between the great powers. This means that they are inherent in the "natural state" of international relations. As for the interactions between the great powers and other states, they can no longer be characterized as anarchic, for they acquire other forms, which most often depend on the will of the great powers.

One of the followers of structuralism, Barry Bazan, developed its main provisions in relation to regional systems, which he considers intermediate between the global international and state systems (29). The most important feature of regional systems is, from his point of view, a security complex. The point is that neighboring states are so closely linked to each other in security issues that the national security of one of them cannot be separated from the national security of others. The structure of any regional subsystem is based on two factors, considered in detail by the author:

the distribution of opportunities among the existing actors and the relationship of friendliness or hostility between them. At the same time, both, B. Bazan shows, are subject to manipulation by the great powers.

Using the methodology proposed in this way, the Danish researcher M. Mozaffari used it as the basis for analyzing the structural changes that took place in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq by allied (and essentially American) troops (30). As a result, he came to the conclusion about the operationality of structuralism, about its advantages over other theoretical directions. At the same time, Mozaffari also shows the weaknesses inherent in neo-realism, among which he names the provisions on the eternity and immutability of such characteristics of the international system as its "natural state", the balance of forces, as a method of stabilization, its inherent static (see: ibid., p. 81).

due to its own advantages than the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to preserve maximum continuity with the classical school means that most of its inherent shortcomings remain the lot of neorealism (see: 14, p. 300, 302). An even harsher sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smui and B. Badi, according to which the theories of international relations, remaining in the captivity of the Western-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to a sinful social reality ”(31).

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main incentives for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline - the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scholars.

3. French sociological school

Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions today. At the same time, it is also indisputable that since the beginning of the 1980s, the influence of European theoretical thought, and in particular the French school, has become more and more tangible in this area. One of the famous scientists, professor at the Sorbonne M. Merle in 1983 noted that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline studying international relations, three major directions have formed. One of them is guided by an "empirical-descriptive approach" and is represented by the works of authors such as Charles Zorgbib, Serge Dreyfus, Philippe Moreau-Defargue and others. The second is inspired by the Marxist positions on which Pierre-François Gonidek, Charles Chaumont and their followers at the School are based Nancy and Reims. Finally, hallmark the third direction is the sociological approach, which received its most striking embodiment in the works of R. Aron (32).

In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of modern

The most important French school in the study of international relations. The fact is that each of the theoretical trends discussed above - idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism - also exist in France. At the same time, they are refracted here in the works of the historical and sociological direction that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left their imprint on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with problems of international relations. As Russian experts note, the formation of the basic methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of the philosophical, sociological and historical thought of France in the late 19th - early 20th centuries, and above all the positivism of Comte. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative-historical method and a certain skepticism about mathematical methods of research (33).

At the same time, in the works of certain specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main currents of sociological thought that emerged already in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical legacy of E. Durkheim, the second is based on the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with the utmost clarity by such major representatives of the two lines in French sociology of international relations as, for example, Raymond Aron and Gaston Boutoul.

“The sociology of Durkheim,” writes R. Aaron in his memoirs, “did not touch in me either the metaphysics that I was striving to become, or the reader of Proust who wanted to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society” (34). "Neo-Durkheimism", he argued, is something like Marxism, on the contrary: if the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and belittles the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, denying the presence of a dominant ideology in society is as much a utopia as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot share

the same values ​​as totalitarian and liberal societies cannot have the same theory (see: ibid., pp. 69-70). Weber, on the other hand, attracted Aaron by the fact that in objectifying social reality, he did not “materialize” it, did not ignore the rationality that people attach to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: M. Weber's assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics and concern for epistemology characteristic of the social sciences (see: ibid., P. 71). The oscillation, central to Weber's thought, between a multitude of plausible interpretations and the only correct explanation of a particular social phenomenon became the basis for the Aronian view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativeism in understanding social - including international - relations.

It is therefore quite logical that R. Aron considers international relations in the spirit of political realism - as a natural or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a radical change in the main feature of international relations, which consists in the legality and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron stresses, peace is impossible, but war is also incredible. Hence, the specificity of the sociology of international relations follows: its main problems are determined not by the minimum of social consensus, which is characteristic of intrasocial relations, but by the fact that they "unfold in the shadow of war." For it is the conflict that is normal for international relations, and not its absence. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not a state of peace, but a state of war.

R. Aron names four groups of basic problems of the sociology of international relations, applicable to the conditions of traditional (industrial) civilization. First, it is "clarifying the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society." Second, "examining which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Thirdly, the study “in each era, in each specific diplomatic system of that set of unwritten rules, more or less observed values ​​that characterize wars and

the conduct of the communities themselves in relation to each other. " Finally, fourthly, the analysis of the “unconscious functions that armed conflicts have performed in history” (35). Of course, most of the current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of flawless sociological research in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, insofar as the above problems retain their significance today. To them can be added new ones arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the XX century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations remains the same, as long as it is determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the central problem will remain the study of the decision-making process. Hence, Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who lead states - on the "rulers" "who can only be advised and hope that they will not be crazy." And this means that "sociology, applied to international relations, reveals, so to speak, its boundaries" (see: ibid., P. 158).

At the same time, Aron does not abandon the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his fundamental work Peace and War among Nations, he identifies four aspects of such study, which he describes in the relevant sections of this book: Theory, Sociology, History and Praxeology (36).

The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Using his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels of theory. The first is designed to answer the questions about “what techniques players have the right to use and what not; how they are distributed on the different lines of the playing court; what they are doing to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the enemy's efforts. " Within the framework of the rules answering such questions, numerous situations may arise, which may be random, or may be the result of actions planned in advance by the players. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations,

which can develop on the site. At this - the second - level of theory, it defines recommendations describing the rules of effective behavior of various participants (for example, goalkeeper, defender, etc.) in certain circumstances of the game. The section identifies and analyzes strategy and diplomacy as typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, examines a set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations.

On this basis, the sociology of international relations is built, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international actors. Sociology is designed to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this way, and not otherwise. Its main task is to study the determinants and patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables that determine the policies of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes such issues as the nature of the influence of the political regime and / or ideology on international relations. Finding them out allows a sociologist to derive not only certain rules of behavior for international actors, but also to identify social types of international conflicts, as well as to formulate the laws of development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or coach. Now he is solving questions of a different kind. How do the matches unfold not on the chalkboard, but on the playground? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? What is the share of technical virtuosity in the success of the team, and how much is the moral qualities of the team?

It is impossible to answer these questions, Aron continues, without resorting to historical research: you need to monitor the course of specific matches, changes in techniques, a variety of techniques and temperaments. The sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then he will needlessly follow the actions of the players and will not be able to understand the meaning of the tactical drawing of this or that game. In the section on history, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of intimidation strategies in the nuclear age, and traces the evolution of the diplomatic

the matter between the two poles of the bipolar world and within each of them.

Finally, in the fourth part, devoted to praxeology, another symbolic character appears - the arbiter. How should the provisions written in the rules of the game be interpreted? Was there a violation of the rules in certain conditions? Moreover, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of one team “judge” both their partners and rivals, and so on. All of these judgments fluctuate between efficiency score ("he played well"), punishment score ("he acted according to the rules") and sports morale score ("this team behaved in accordance with the spirit of the game"). Even in sports, not everything that is not prohibited is morally justified. Moreover, this applies to international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited to observation and description, but requires judgments and evaluations. Which strategy can be considered moral and which is reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of seeking peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?

As already noted, Aron's book "Peace and War between Nations" has played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school, and in particular - the sociology of international relations. Of course, the followers of his views (Jean-Pierre Derrienik, Robert Boeck, Jacques Unzinger, etc.) take into account that many of the positions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that “he did not half achieve his goal”, and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns precisely the sociological section, and in particular, the specific application of laws and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see: 34, p. 457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and most importantly, the substantiation of the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.

Explaining this understanding, J.-P. Derrienik (37) emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology:

deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is rather arbitrary, since actionalism does not deny causality, but determinism

nism is also "subjective", for it is the formulation of the intention of the researcher. Its justification lies in the researcher's necessary distrust of the judgments of the people he is studying. Specifically, this difference lies in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of reasons of a special kind that must be taken into account. These reasons are decisions, that is, a choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is the sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (which is associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with evaluation criteria). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problematics of the sociology of international relations is the concept of “solution”. At the same time, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue in the opinion of the sociologist (i.e., from interests).

As for the second trend in the French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid down by Gaston Boutoul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as Jean-Louis Annequin, Jacques Freund, Lucien Pu-arie and others. polemology is based on a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of "collective aggressiveness" with the use of methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences.

The basis of polemology, writes G. Butul, is dynamic sociology. The latter is “a part of the science that studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors that determine them or correspond to them, as well as the ways of their reproduction” (38). Proceeding from the position of E. Durkheim that sociology is “a history comprehended in a certain way,” polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave rise to history, since the latter began exclusively as a history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be a "history of wars." Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and borrowing of cultures, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, "violent imitation": war does not allow states and peoples to conceive

to repent in autarchy, in self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact between civilizations. But in addition, it is also a "voluntary imitation" associated with the fact that peoples passionately borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging wars, etc. - up to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technological progress: for example, the desire to destroy Carthage became an incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding. And today all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most visible of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.

Polemology should avoid a political and legal approach, bearing in mind that "polygics is the enemy of sociology," which it constantly tries to subjugate, make it its servant, just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology actually cannot study current conflicts, and therefore, the main thing for it is the historical approach.

The main task of polemology is the objective and scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that is observable just like any other social phenomenon and which, at the same time, is able to explain the reasons for global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles associated with the pseudo-evidence of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should talk about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with legal illusion, explaining the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (assimilation of wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of the sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the joining of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.

What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “new chapter in sociology,” as G. Butul calls the polemological direction in his book (see: ibid., P. 8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has

goals, a truly huge source study base, which is rarely available at the disposal of other branches of sociological science. Therefore, the main question is in what directions to carry out the classification of the innumerable facts of this huge array of documentation. Butul names eight such directions: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their decreasing objectivity; 2) a description of the types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of the participants in the wars about their goals;

3) the first stage of the explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts;

4) the second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical "views and doctrines; 5) selection and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the frequency of wars; 8) social typology wars - that is, the dependence of the main characteristics of war on the typical features of a particular society (see: ibid., pp. 18-25).