home In contact with Press about insurance, insurance companies and the insurance market. Press about insurance, insurance companies and the insurance market Interpretation in ethics

Press about insurance, insurance companies and the insurance market. Press about insurance, insurance companies and the insurance market Interpretation in ethics

"Personnel. ru", 2014, N 1

ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FULL COLLECTIVE LIABILITY

To reveal the topic of introducing a full collective liability, it is necessary first of all to understand for what purposes and how teams (teams) are created. In some cases, due to objective reasons, one employee cannot perform the entire scope of work, which inevitably raises the need to unite employees into groups.

If the work performed by the group is related to the storage, processing, sale (vacation), transportation, use or other use of the values transferred to employees, and it is impossible to distinguish between the responsibility of each of them in case of damage, the law defines such a group as a team (team), for whose employees may be subject to collective (brigade) liability (part 1 of article 245 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation).

The emergence of collectives (teams) is typical for such areas of activity as trade, construction, catering. The sphere of financial services is no exception, in which, in order to carry out transactions with in cash brigades or teams of workers are also created.

Collective liability is a derivative of the full liability of the employee, which means his obligation to compensate the employer for direct real damage in full (Article 242 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation).

While the limited liability of an employee means his obligation to compensate the employer for direct actual damage within the limits of his monthly earnings, unless otherwise established by the Labor Code of the Russian Federation or other federal laws, according to Art. Art. 238 and 241 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. The amount of damage exceeding the average monthly salary of an employee is not subject to compensation.

It should be noted that the introduction by the employer of full collective (team) responsibility allows all members of the team (team) to mutually control the safety of the employer's material assets.

Let us consider in more detail the procedure for establishing collective (team) responsibility.

To protect the rights of employees, the employer can conclude an agreement with them on full liability. To do this, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 244 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, the following conditions must be simultaneously met:

Reaching the age of 18 by the employee;

The labor function should provide for the maintenance or use of money, commodity values or other property and is named as part of the work or positions (professions) included in the approved list.

Thus, Decree of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 31, 2002 N 85 "On approval of the Lists of positions and works replaced or performed by employees with whom the employer can enter into written agreements on full individual or collective (team) liability, as well as standard forms of agreements on full material responsibility" (hereinafter referred to as the Decree of the Ministry of Labor of Russia N 85) approved:

A list of positions and works to be replaced or performed by employees with whom the employer may enter into written agreements on full individual liability for the shortage of entrusted property;

A list of works, during the performance of which full collective (team) liability for the shortage of property entrusted to employees can be introduced.

The decision of the employer on the introduction of full collective (team) liability is formalized by order; each employee of the collective (team) must be familiarized with it against signature. This order must be attached to the liability agreement (see Appendix 1).

On a note. If the labor function does not provide for the maintenance of material values, then the condition in employment contract the fact that the employee is obliged to fulfill obligations on full liability, even if there is an appropriate agreement on full liability, does not apply, since it reduces the level of rights and guarantees of the employee, and therefore the contract on full liability concluded in accordance with this does not apply .

In accordance with Part 2 of Art. 245 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, an agreement on collective (team) liability for damage is concluded between the employer and all members of the team (team) in writing. Under an agreement on collective (team) liability, valuables are entrusted to a predetermined group of persons, which is fully liable for their shortage (part 3 of article 245 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation).

Due to the fact that non-compliance with the requirements of the current labor legislation on the procedure and conditions for concluding and executing an agreement on full material liability can serve as a basis for releasing the employee from the obligation to compensate the damage in full if necessary, it is necessary to elaborate on the agreement on full liability.

The conclusion of an agreement on full liability is the duty of an employee whose labor function is related to the maintenance of material assets and is indicated in the composition of works or positions (professions) in the Lists approved by Decree of the Ministry of Labor of Russia N 85.

Refusal of the employee to sign an agreement on full liability, if the fulfillment of duties for the maintenance of material assets is the main labor function employee, which is agreed upon when hiring, may be considered as a failure to fulfill job duties with all the ensuing consequences (paragraph 36 of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of March 17, 2004 N 2 "On the application by the courts Russian Federation Labor Code Russian Federation").

The general provisions of the agreement on full collective (team) liability are provided for in the standard form of such an agreement, approved by Decree of the Ministry of Labor of Russia N 85. It should be noted that the standard form of the agreement is advisory in nature and the employer has the right to make the necessary changes.

At the same time, some deviations from the standard form can lead to disputes between the employee and the employer, and as a result, to the invalidity of the contract. So, the absence in the contract of a condition on the right of the team (brigade) to take part in the inventory, audit, other verification (clause "b", clause 6 of the Model Form) prevents the application of liability measures. The absence of an indication of the employer's decision to establish full collective liability (clause 1 of the Standard Form) entails the risk of recognizing the agreement on full collective (team) liability as invalid.

Thus, if the employer decides to apply its form of agreement on full collective (brigade) liability, it is necessary to make sure that the conditions in the form of the employer do not worsen the position of the employee compared to those in the standard form.

The conclusion of agreements on full liability with other employees (whose positions are not indicated in the lists) may entail the application of administrative liability measures in accordance with the provisions of Art. 5.27 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation, and the concluded contract will be considered invalid (clause 4 of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated November 16, 2006 N 52 "On the application by the courts of legislation governing the liability of employees for damage caused to the employer").

A written agreement on collective / team liability for damage is concluded between the employer and all members of the team (team).

The management of the team (team) is carried out by a foreman appointed by order of the employer. In the event of a change of foreman or when more than 50% of the employees from his (her) initial composition leave the team (team), the full liability agreement must be renegotiated. The contract is not renegotiated upon leaving the team (team) individual workers or admission to the team (team) of new people. In these cases, the date of his departure is indicated against the signature of the retired member of the team (team), and the accepted employee signs the contract and indicates the date of joining the team (team) in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Standard form of the contract on full collective (team) responsibility.

When appointing a foreman, including new employees in a team / team, the opinion of the team should be taken into account. The legislation, however, does not establish how exactly it should be taken into account. Most comments on the legislation also do not disclose the procedure for such accounting. And yet, due to the specifics of collective (team) responsibility, disputes between employees and the employer are possible in the case when the opinion of the collective, containing the agreement to share responsibility with a new member, is not recorded by anyone and nowhere.

The absence of a direct regulation in the legislation allows the employer to independently establish the procedure for taking into account the opinion of the team. The following algorithm can be envisaged. The head of the team (foreman), if he intends to include a new employee in the team, notifies all its members in writing (see Appendix 2) and provides full information about this employee. The team (team), in turn, forms its opinion on the new employee, for example, by voting on general meeting collective (team) and fixing the results of such voting in the minutes. Voting can be either open or secret. The protocol is presented to the foreman for making an appropriate decision.

There is another option, which, moreover, seems to be less labor-intensive.

It is necessary to provide for mandatory written notification of the members of the team (team) of the intention to include a new employee in their composition. The foreman passes the notification to the members of the team (team) against signature and within 3-5 days expects a reasoned refusal (objection) from each of them. If there are no objections or if the majority of the members of the team (team) refrain from such objections, a decision is made to include the candidate in the team (team) (see Appendix 3).

If the team (team) refuses to accept a new employee, he can be offered a job in another team (team), taking into account the opinion of the team (team) or offer other work outside the team (team).

These rules are best fixed in the text of the agreement on full collective (material) liability or in the corresponding local normative act employer. However, it must be remembered that in this case, all employees should be familiarized with the document against signature (part 2 of article 22 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation).

Thus, despite the fact that the institution of full collective liability has existed for quite a long time, a number of issues remain unresolved to date. In this connection, it seems necessary to pay special attention to local regulations employer, regulating issues of full material collective (team) liability.

Annex 1

Moscow 05.09.2013

ORDER N 1

On the establishment of a collective (brigade)

liability

In connection with the need to ensure the safety of the warehouse property of the department

reception and due to the impossibility of delimiting the responsibility of each

employee in case of damage, guided by Art. 245 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation,

I ORDER:

1. Establish a complete collective (brigade) material

responsibility of employees of the reception department performing work on reception,

storage and release of products of FORTUNA LLC.

2. Include in the team (team) employees of the reception department

(Appendix 1 "List of employees of the reception department").

3. Appoint the head of the team (team) of the head of the department

reception Petrov Ivan Sergeevich.

4. To the head of the personnel department, Victoria Petrovna Sidorova, before

4.1. familiarize with this Order under the signature of the employees of the department

4.2. explain to these employees their rights and obligations arising in

connection with the signing of an agreement on full liability;

4.3. ensure that these employees sign an agreement on the full

collective (brigade) liability.

5. I reserve control over the execution of this Order.

Acquainted with the order:

Annex 1

to the Order dated 05.09.2013

"On the establishment of a collective (brigade)

liability"

List of employees of the reception department

Appendix 2

Society with limited liability"FORTUNE"

Moscow 15.09.2013

NOTIFICATION

Dear worker!

We remind you that in accordance with the local act of the employer, accounting

opinions of the team (team) is formed at the general meeting of the team

assembly.

HR department by sending a request on behalf of the head

team (team).

General Director Lakin (Lakin Alexander Ivanovich)

Notification received:

Appendix 3

Limited Liability Company "FORTUNA"

Moscow 15.09.2013

NOTIFICATION

employee of the team (team) of the reception department

on the admission of a new employee to the team (team)

Dear worker!

Due to the increase in the number of the reception department, we inform you that in

the composition of the department is proposed to include Ivanov Roman Alexandrovich in

junior specialist positions.

Considering that by Order No. 1 dated 03.05.2013 employees of the sales department

full collective (team) responsibility is established, you can

take part in shaping the opinion of the team (team) about the new member

for it to be taken into account by the employer when deciding on the inclusion of Roman Ivanov

Alexandrovich in the composition of the team (team).

We remind you that in accordance with the local act of FORTUNA LLC, the opinion

team (team) is formed by sending to the employer

reasoned refusal (objection) (if any) of each member

team (team) within 5 (five) working days from the date of receipt

the corresponding notice.

In this regard, we ask you, if there is a reasoned refusal

(objections) on admission to the team (team) of a new member send

within 5 (five) working days from the date of receipt of this

notifications.

Please note that if there are no objections or a majority

members of the collective (team) refrain from such objections,

the employer has the right to decide on the inclusion of Roman Ivanov

Alexandrovich in the composition of the team (team).

Information needed to form an opinion can be obtained from

Human Resources Department by sending a request on behalf of

team leader (team).

General Director Lakin (Lakin Alexander Ivanovich)

Notification received:

________________________ _______________ "__" _____________ 201_

Full name of the employee signature date

N. S. Shendrik

Head of

The Main Investigation Department (GSU) at the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Moscow, as it became known to Vremya novostei, opened a series of criminal cases on tax evasion against the heads of a number of insurance companies - LLC European Insurance Company (ESK), LLC IC Prombezopasnost ”, CJSC SAK Informstrakh and CJSC Nika Plus.

The basis for this was the materials obtained during the investigation of the former economist of the Moscow Metropol Bank, Sergei Tikhomirov, who, as the investigation believes, once organized a large-scale scheme for illegal cashing out of money. Among his clients, according to the GSU, were these insurance companies, which Mr. Tikhomirov also helped to evade income tax by pumping money through his bank under the guise of fictitious reinsurance contracts.

As a result of the "criminal actions" of insurers, according to the GSU, the state missed about 200 million rubles. The leaders of these companies fully admit their guilt, and in one of these cases a guilty verdict has recently entered into force. As for Mr. Tikhomirov himself, who is still on the wanted list, the damage inflicted by him, according to preliminary estimates, amounted to over 50 billion rubles.

Detectives from the Department of Economic Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs learned about the cash-out business organized by Sergey Tikhomirov five years ago from the materials of the audit tax office No. 50. It followed from them that tax authorities about 250 one-day firms were registered (such as OOO SK Zolotoy Garant, OOO PK FinGaRe and OOO PK FinRe, OOO Invest-Garant), which had zero balances, did not conduct any entrepreneurial activity, but several tens of millions of rubles were pumped through their accounts every day.

During the audit, the detectives found that almost all such firms were registered "to persons who had nothing to do with the financial and economic activities of the companies, and their actual leader was Tikhomirov." As it turned out, it was he who organized a large scheme for illegal cashing out of money, the services of which were used by various Moscow insurance companies. The policemen established that the accounts of more than 50 one-day firms were registered with the Metropol bank. According to rough estimates, in 2006-2007 alone, over 50 billion rubles were transferred in this way through Metropol. For his services, Mr. Tikhomirov, as the detectives found out, took a commission, which varied depending on the situation on the market. For example, if law enforcement in some period, it was possible to “cover up” several underground structures, then the percentage on the transaction immediately jumped. The commission also depended on the time of day, urgency, amount, etc. -- from 0.5 to 7% for each operation.

On the basis of these data, in August last year, the State Investigation Department opened a criminal case against Mr. Tikhomirov, charging him with illegal business and aiding in tax evasion. At the same time, a search was carried out in his office on Vorontsovskaya Street, where “documents of the financial and economic activities of several cash-out companies, drawn up on the instructions of Tikhomirov, as well as the seals of fictitious companies and the bank-client electronic document management system, were found and seized. Mr. Tikhomirov himself, without waiting for his arrest, went on the run, in connection with which he was later declared in international wanted list.

Meanwhile, the investigation continued, and in December last year, the State Investigation Office opened several more cases already against regular customers fugitive. The general directors of several insurance companies at once fell under suspicion - Lyudmila Zimina (ESK), Vladimir Vinogradov (Prombezopasnost), Vladimir Proshin (SAK Informstrakh) and Marat Kamalov (Nika Plus). The investigation established that all of them at different times “recoursed to the services of Tikhomirov and his companies to evade income tax for supposedly rendered reinsurance services.”

All these companies were engaged in insurance of various risks, accidents, property of individuals and legal entities and for all types of activities had the appropriate licenses. At the same time, they often resorted to the services of reinsurance companies, since in many transactions they could not independently withstand the insurance liability. Roughly speaking, in the event of insured events, the insurers did not have enough funds to make all the payments stipulated by the contracts, and the reinsurance companies assumed part of the responsibility, guaranteeing full payments.

Among the firms with which insurance companies cooperated in this way were FinRe PC, FinGaRe PC and Zolotoy Garant Insurance Company. During interrogations, the businessmen admitted that they knew that these firms were “controlled by Tikhomirov” and, in fact, were “one-day businessmen”. However, they were forced to resort to their services due to the fact that insurance companies at different times found themselves in a “difficult financial situation and were not able to fully pay for the work of employees, which could lead to their dismissals and the loss of most of the counterparties, which attracted to inevitable bankruptcy. And the firms controlled by Tikhomirov could also help in “minimizing” income tax. However, none of the merchants could remember who exactly recommended that they turn to Tikhomirov "for support".

The scheme of interaction between Mr. Tikhomirov and insurance companies was clearly worked out. By e-mail the general director of one of them contacted the office of the schemer, after which "the sequence of actions for the implementation of reinsurance operations was agreed upon." A few days later, the insurer received a package from the courier constituent documents, copies of licenses and details of one of the one-day firms. Then the heads of insurance companies (ICs) prepared a package of documents “evidencing the alleged financial and economic relations of the IC with fictitious firms,” and sent Tikhomirov by courier with a request to sign them on behalf of the nominees “to give legality to the transactions.” As soon as the documents were returned with signatures and seals of supposedly heads of front companies, money was credited to their accounts. This information was reflected in the statements of insurance companies, which formally led to an underestimation of profits and, accordingly, to a decrease in tax amounts.

Thus, the investigation found that ESK did not pay about 12 million rubles to the budget, Prombezopasnost and SAK Informstrakh - more than 50 million rubles. each, and Nika Plus caused damage to the state in the amount of more than 100 million rubles.

“In the course of the investigation, it also turned out that the general director of Nika Plus entered into false contracts to risk the lives of his 500 subordinates,” Senior Lieutenant of Justice Pavel Demenko, an investigator of the 6th department of the investigative unit of the Main Investigative Directorate, told Vremya Novostey. -- As a result, employees of the company received a monthly advance from their salary as an insurance payment for allegedly received various physical injuries. We did not disregard the Metropol Bank, through which, according to approximate estimates, about 50 billion rubles were pumped. A criminal case was initiated against its leaders under Art. 172 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (illegal banking). As part of this investigation, searches were recently carried out at the homes of the bank's executives and some of its employees. So far, the bankers in the case are considered suspects, but I do not exclude that their procedural status will change in the near future. In addition, the other day, the guilty verdict of the Tushinsky District Court of Moscow in the case of ESK General Director Zimina entered into force. Since she fully admitted her guilt and sincerely repented of her deed, the court sentenced her to a fine of 500 thousand rubles.

Ekaterina KARACHEVA

The Main Investigation Directorate (GSU) at the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Moscow, as it became known to Vremya novostei, opened a whole series of criminal cases on tax evasion against the heads of a number of insurance companies - LLC European Insurance Company (ESK), LLC IC Prombezopasnost , CJSC SAK Informstrakh and CJSC Nika Plus. The basis for this was the materials obtained during the investigation of the former economist of the Moscow Metropol Bank, Sergei Tikhomirov, who, as the investigation believes, once organized a large-scale scheme for illegal cashing out of money. Among his clients, according to the GSU, were these insurance companies, which Mr. Tikhomirov also helped to evade income tax by pumping money through his bank under the guise of fictitious reinsurance contracts.

Detectives from the Department of Economic Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs learned about the “cash out” business organized by Sergei Tikhomirov five years ago from the materials of the audit of the tax inspectorate No. 50. It followed from them that about 250 one-day firms were registered with the tax authorities (such as LLC SK Zolotoy Garant, LLC PK FinGaRe and LLC PK FinRe, LLC Invest-Garant) that had zero balances, did not conduct any entrepreneurial activity, but several tens of millions of rubles were pumped through their accounts every day.

During the audit, the detectives found that almost all such firms were registered "to persons who had nothing to do with the financial and economic activities of the companies, and their actual leader was Tikhomirov." As it turned out, it was he who organized a large scheme for illegal cashing out of money, the services of which were used by various Moscow insurance companies. The policemen established that the accounts of more than 50 one-day firms were registered with the Metropol bank. According to rough estimates, in 2006–2007 alone, over 50 billion rubles were transferred in this way through Metropol. For his services, Mr. Tikhomirov, as the detectives found out, took a commission, which varied depending on the situation on the market. For example, if law enforcement agencies at some time managed to “cover up” several underground structures, then the percentage on the transaction immediately jumped up. The commission also depended on the time of day, urgency, amount, etc. – from 0.5 to 7% for each operation.

On the basis of these data, in August last year, the GSU opened a criminal case against Mr. Tikhomirov, charging him with illegal business and complicity in tax evasion. At the same time, a search was carried out in his office on Vorontsovskaya Street, where “documents of the financial and economic activities of several cash-out companies, drawn up on the instructions of Tikhomirov, as well as the seals of fictitious companies and the bank-client electronic document management system, were found and seized. Mr. Tikhomirov himself, without waiting for his arrest, went on the run, in connection with which he was later put on the international wanted list.

Meanwhile, the investigation continued, and in December last year, the State Investigation Department opened several more cases against the fugitive's regular clients. Under suspicion were the CEOs of several insurance companies at once - Lyudmila Zimina (ESK), Vladimir Vinogradov (Prombezopasnost), Vladimir Proshin (SAK Informstrakh) and Marat Kamalov (Nika Plus). The investigation established that all of them at different times “recoursed to the services of Tikhomirov and his companies to evade income tax for supposedly rendered reinsurance services.”

All these companies were engaged in insurance of various risks, accidents, property of individuals and legal entities and had appropriate licenses for all types of activities. At the same time, they often resorted to the services of reinsurance companies, since in many transactions they could not independently withstand the insurance liability. Roughly speaking, in the event of insured events, the insurers did not have enough funds to make all the payments stipulated by the contracts, and the reinsurance companies assumed part of the responsibility, guaranteeing full payments.

The scheme of interaction between Mr. Tikhomirov and insurance companies was clearly worked out. By e-mail, the general director of one of them contacted the office of the schemer, after which "the sequence of actions for the implementation of reinsurance operations was agreed upon." A few days later, the insurer received from the courier a package of constituent documents, copies of licenses and details of one of the one-day firms. Then the heads of insurance companies (ICs) prepared a package of documents “evidencing the alleged financial and economic relations of the IC with fictitious firms,” and sent Tikhomirov by courier with a request to sign them on behalf of the nominees “to give legality to the transactions.” As soon as the documents were returned with signatures and seals of supposedly heads of front companies, money was credited to their accounts. This information was reflected in the statements of insurance companies, which formally led to an underestimation of profits and, accordingly, to a decrease in tax amounts.

Thus, the investigation found that ESK did not pay about 12 million rubles to the budget, Prombezopasnost and SAK Informstrakh - over 50 million rubles. each, and Nika Plus caused damage to the state in the amount of more than 100 million rubles.

“In the course of the investigation, it also turned out that the general director of Nika Plus entered into false contracts to risk the lives of his 500 subordinates,” senior lieutenant of justice Pavel Demenko, an investigator of the 6th department of the investigative unit of the Main Investigative Directorate, told Vremya Novostey. “As a result, employees of the company received a monthly advance from their salary as an insurance payment for allegedly received various physical injuries. We did not disregard the Metropol Bank, through which, according to approximate estimates, about 50 billion rubles were pumped. A criminal case was initiated against its leaders under Art. 172 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (illegal banking). As part of this investigation, searches were recently carried out at the homes of the bank's executives and some of its employees. So far, the bankers in the case are considered suspects, but I do not exclude that their procedural status will change in the near future. In addition, the other day, the guilty verdict of the Tushinsky District Court of Moscow in the case of ESK General Director Zimina entered into force. Since she fully admitted her guilt and sincerely repented of her deed, the court sentenced her to a fine of 500 thousand rubles. >Vremya Novosti Karacheva E.

We continue to discuss the most pressing issues that were raised during the November 12 meeting of the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation.

President Vladimir Putin said he was not against imposing responsibility for persecution due to criticism, including from journalists, RIA Novosti reports.

“We need to think about it, I don't see anything wrong here,” he said, commenting on the corresponding proposal made by journalist Elena Masyuk, in whose speech a proposal was made to return the corresponding article to the criminal code. “In the Soviet Criminal Code there was an article 139 “Prosecution of citizens for criticism”. There is no such article in the current code, and it seems to me that this is in vain. If an article on libel is returned, then similar liability should be established in cases of persecution for criticism,” the journalist said. The president is not opposed to developing a mechanism, some kind of “legal technique” for officials to respond to critical articles in the media, but so far he does not quite understand how this can be done. “I am ready, but the mechanism, the legal technique must be effective,” he said.

In her speech, the well-known journalist raised a whole range of interrelated issues united by one theme - relations between media representatives and the authorities, most of which are either not regulated by law or the relevant articles do not work. Persecution of journalists because of criticism is closely linked to the return to the Criminal Code libel articles. Recall, on July 30, Putin signed a law on the restoration of criminal liability for libel, transferred in December 2011 to the category of administrative offenses. Now, according to the current law, the dissemination of knowingly false information that discredits the honor and dignity of another person is punishable by a fine or compulsory works. At the stage of discussion, the bill caused a negative reaction from a number of representatives of the journalistic community, who saw in the document a desire to restrict freedom of speech, in particular the right to criticize the authorities. According to the journalist, “the first reaction of many bosses who read criticism about themselves in the newspaper or saw some kind of critical report is to accuse the journalist of slander.” In the context of the current judicial system When an official has absolute priority, it is the accusation of libel that can be an excellent means of destroying the remnants of an independent press. The President supported the initiative of the journalist. “I think that it is possible (to clarify the wording), so much has already been argued about this. The vast majority of countries have such an article,” Putin said. Meanwhile, he added, officials also sometimes need protection from journalists. “They (officials - ed.) cannot be smeared with the same mud. We need to protect them from unreasonable raids.”

The next burning question raised by Elena Masyuk concerned lack of reaction of responsible persons to criticism of media representatives. “In 1996, a Decree was issued that obliged all leaders to consider critical media publications within three days and inform the editors about the measures taken within two weeks. Now the vast majority of critical publications remain unanswered; officials have responded to freedom of speech with “freedom of hearing”. This is very convenient for officials, but extremely dangerous for society, and in the end, in fact, all of us, all of us, turned out to be the losers,” the correspondent said. She came out with a proposal to instruct the State Legal Department of the President, together with members of the Human Rights Council, to prepare a draft of an appropriate decree or law that would no longer allow officials to ignore the press. “I want to do it,” Putin replied simply.

In addition, the President promised to control progress in the investigation of attacks on journalists.“I will definitely return to this in the very near future,” he told the members of the Council. Masyuk drew the attention of the audience to another non-working letter of the law. “Last year, criminal liability for obstruction of legal professional activity journalists. But this article still doesn't work. According to the Union of Journalists of Russia, since December last year alone, about 30 journalists have been injured while carrying out professional duties, but no one was punished for this, despite the fact that these were violent actions against journalists.”

“We need to think about it, I don’t see anything wrong here”, “I will definitely return to this as soon as possible”, “I want to do it”, “Let's think together, I have nothing against it” and, finally, “I” for”, I just don’t really understand how we can do this with you. ” These are the answers of President Vladimir Putin to the burning questions posed in the speech of the journalist (quoted).

What kind of civil society can we talk about in a country if its president comments on relations between the authorities and the media in this way: “... a real man should always try and a real girl should always resist... this means that the authorities are trying to reduce the amount of criticism directed at them, and the media always draw attention to the mistakes of the authorities” (from a speech at a meeting with journalists in the Kremlin in December 2004). Elena Masyuk cited this quote in her speech. And although Putin explained: “I took this from a movie, from a famous movie. It’s a joke,” but that’s how the president defined the level of freedom of speech in Russia.

a character trait that is clearly manifested at the “setting” and behavioral level both as a readiness and as a realization of this readiness to take on the burden of decision-making and sanctions for failure, not only when this activity is carried out by the “responsible subject” himself, but also when he is formally or informally entrusted with control over the manifestations of group activity and its consequences. As part of the functioning of an official group or organization, the “responsible entity” is entrusted with external forms of stimulating and sanctioning its responsible behavior (accountability, punishability and the right to enforce control, etc.). Of course, in this case, at the same time, this person also functions in the presence of internal forms of volitional self-regulation of his responsible activity, but nevertheless, these forms (sense of responsibility, sense of duty, etc.) are decisive when it is the informal system of interpersonal relations that is included in group, and especially when it comes to informal communities in general. At the same time, it should be noted that at the behavioral level, responsibility as a personality trait is most clearly manifested in the manifestations of the socio-psychological phenomenon of attribution of responsibility for successes and failures in a joint activity. Within the framework of the theory of activity mediation of interpersonal relations in a group (A. V. Petrovsky), it was shown that in groups of different levels of socio-psychological development, members of the community attribute and evaluate responsibility for the results of group activity in different ways. Genuinely responsible behavior, when an individual takes responsibility, first of all, for failures and obsessively, defiantly does not emphasize his exceptional contribution to the group-wide success, is perceived by the community as a completely normative personal position. In a group with a low level of development, such behavior, as a rule, is regarded as above the norm and, at the same time, weighed down by some ambitious and pragmatic motives.

It is quite obvious that responsibility as a stable character trait is directly related to such personal parameters as internality-externality and achievement motivation. It is clear that an individual with a developed sense of responsibility is more inclined to consider successes and failures as the result of his own activity, and not to attribute them to external circumstances. Similarly, the completely conscious willingness of the individual to take responsibility for the possible unsuccessful outcome of an enterprise associated with an increased, albeit calculated in advance, risk, reinforces the achievement mindset (which should in no case be confused with the reckless willingness to take unreasonable risks, which is characteristic of just irresponsible people). It must be said that the causal structure of relationships in this triad today remains insufficiently studied in modern psychology, however, it can be said with confidence that the formation of responsibility as a dispositional personal attitude as well as the attitude towards achieving and localizing the personality in the continuum "internality- externality”, is largely determined by the specifics of individual development at an early age.

There is a rather stable stereotype according to which the formation of responsibility in a child is facilitated by a rigidly defined behavioral framework, high demands and control from adults, i.e., in fact, an authoritarian model of education. In fact, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that such an educational model, as a rule, leads to total irresponsibility, characteristic of an authoritarian personality. A clear confirmation of this thesis can be the total unwillingness and inability to recognize personal responsibility for the failures inherent in regular military men, most of whom were brought up in precisely such conditions (it is no coincidence that the well-known maxim “Victory has many fathers, defeat is always an orphan” has become widespread in almost all countries of Western civilization). Suffice it to recall how, after the sinking of the Kursk submarine, the military bureaucrats quite persistently convinced the public that there was a mythical “NATO” submarine that allegedly rammed a Russian boat. Moreover, none of the "heroes" of that tragic history did not admit responsibility for what happened even after the end of the official investigation, which came to the unequivocal conclusion that the cause of the disaster was a faulty torpedo on board the submarine.

Such a desire to shift one's own, both official - official, and informal (in the given example, moral) responsibility onto anyone else, is also fully inherent in the civil bureaucracy. At the same time, it is combined with a stable, socio-pathological desire to attribute to oneself personally the main merit in any, including rather dubious, achievements. An example is the readiness with which the heads of law enforcement agencies accepted the highest state awards for the “successful” operation to rescue hostages in the theater center on Dubrovka (the infamous “Nord-Ost”), during which dozens of innocent people died. Such personal attitudes are also formed in the process of authoritarian upbringing, in which a positive assessment from adults is received not by the child’s real achievements, but by his readiness and ability to “know his place” and act strictly within the rules and regulations. Under certain conditions, a clearly expressed personal attitude to refuse responsibility for failures, combined with attributing to oneself exceptional merit in achieving success, gives rise to such an extremely socially dangerous phenomenon as the Tsakhes phenomenon.

A necessary condition for the formation of a full-fledged sense of responsibility in a child is not dictate and guardianship by adults, but a strategy of cooperation and partnership. Among other things, it involves providing a sufficient degree of freedom and the right to make mistakes both within the framework of substantive activities and interpersonal interaction with senior partners. Moreover, these conditions must be observed at a fairly early age.

It must be said that, as shown in a number of studies, along with personal predisposition, there are a number of socio-psychological variables proper, which increase or, conversely, decrease the likelihood of an individual's responsible behavior in a given situation. One of them, as already noted, is the level of group development.

Another factor significantly influencing the willingness of the individual to take responsibility is the predictability and awareness by him of the possible consequences of his activity. The validity of this thesis was confirmed, in particular, in an experiment conducted in 1979 by a group of psychologists at Princeton University. The experimenters asked the students to “...record on tape speeches in support of doubling the number of students in first-year groups. (This was a nasty prospect for students, as Princeton has a reputation for being a small, elite college.) Some students have been told that their presentation may be considered by the members of the admissions committee that deals with this issue (predicted consequences); others were told that the performances would be given to some groups, but the groups were not named (foreseeable consequences). And others were not told anything about any further use their speeches (unpredictable consequences). After the speeches were recorded, everyone was told that their counter-attitudinal speeches would be submitted to the selection committee.... Both predicted and predictable consequences caused a change in attitude in the direction of the participant's speech. Only in the event of unpredictable consequences, this did not happen. In this context, it is quite legitimate to consider the change in the initial attitude of the subjects as evidence of their readiness to take responsibility for the possible consequences of their speeches.

Another factor that significantly affects the willingness of an individual to take responsibility both for the consequences of an activity act itself and for choosing one or another alternative at the decision-making and planning stage is the degree of anonymity of the proposed actions. As socio-psychological practice shows, “impersonal activity” (“Let’s start working, and in a couple of months we will get together and see how far we have progressed”) leads to the blurring of responsibility even in groups high level development. This is confirmed by the results of a number of experiments.

During one of them, held in the United States in the early 80s. During the 20th century, “during the All Saints’ Day celebrations, groups of children who showed up at one of the houses with traditional threats and demands for treats were asked in return to donate sweets for children from the local hospital. The study used three experimental conditions to manipulate children's perceptions of their personal responsibility. In the first experimental situation, the woman who met the children made everyone personally responsible for the sweets they donated by saying that she would write the child's name on the candy bag. In the second case, she made one child responsible for the entire group in the same way. In the third situation, personal responsibility was not emphasized in any way. The difference in responsibility had a clear effect on the number of candies donated by the children... When the individual responsibility of each child was emphasized, the average number of donated candies was five children when one child was responsible for the whole group, the average number of donated candies dropped to three when no one was responsible. was not responsible, each child gave only two sweets. The more the child's personal responsibility was emphasized, the more generously he helped sick children.

The obvious practical conclusion from this and a number of similar experiments is not only the expediency, but also the need for a clear distribution of personal responsibility of group members for the implementation of group decisions. And yet in similar cases It probably makes sense to talk not so much about responsibility, but about socially approved behavior and the fear of public condemnation. The most important moment in the context of the issues under consideration is the question of the willingness to accept personal responsibility as a sustainable personal characteristics specific member of an equally specific community.

Therefore, practical social psychologist should clearly distinguish, when working with a specific group or organization, cases of aspiration to escape from the well-deserved responsibility of some members of the group, exalted sacrificial, sometimes hysterical attempts to take on the entire burden of responsibility for the general group and at the same time bad decision tasks of others and manifestations of genuine, quite adequate personal responsibility of the third.